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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

ExcELSIOR IRoN niiNING CoMPANY, a corporation, and UTAH CoNSTRUCTION
CoMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
vs.
CLARENCE I. J usTHEIM and
RoBERT GoRLINSKI,
Defendants and .Appellants,
CLARENCE I. J USTHEIM,
C.ross-Plaintiff and .Appellant,
vs.
ExcELSIOR IRoN MINING CoMPANY, a corporation, and UTAH CoNSTRUCTION
CoMPANY, a corporation,
Cross-Defendants and Appellees.

Case No. 7825

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 16, 1879, the United States Government patented and conveyed to J·oseph R. Walker and
Jediah !1. Blair the Armstrong placer which embraced
the Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of Sec-
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tion 32 in Township 35 South of Range 12 West, in
Iron .Springs Mining District in Iron County, Utah.
The area conveyed in the placer claim consisted of
38.24 acres. Also by this patent there was conveyed to
the patentees the "Armstrong Iron Mine", designated
as Lot 41 by the Surveyor General. This "iron mine"
was patented as a known existing lode· claim within the
patented placer claim (R. 95). It embraced 1.76 acres,
and its length was 396 feet in the approximate direction of Northeast to Southwest and its width was 210
feet. In describing the lode claim the patent fixed the
quarter section corner on the Westerly boundary line
of Section 32 above, as bearing West 790 feet from the
Southwesterly corner of said claim (Corner No. 2)
(R. 23).
In 1902 one Thomas J. Jones made a location known
as Cora No. 1, which he thereafter amended. When
the Surveyor ._General made the survey for the Cora
No. 1 he discovered that the description of the ''Armstrong Iron Mine'' contained in the Walker-Blair patent (R. 231) was erroneous in the fact that the South
line of the Armstrong placer claim (Southwest quarter
of Northwest quarter of Section 32, aforesaid) was
approximately 135 feet South of the South line of the
Armstrong "iron mine". Stated otherwise, the west
quarter corner of Section 32 was not due west of the
Southwest corner of the ''iron mine'' as described
in the Walker-Blair ~patent, but in truth the quarter corner was located South 79 de g. 09' West 839 feet
from Corner No. 1 of the Cora No. 1 lode claim,
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"''. hich Corner No. 1 \Ya~ 102 feet west of the South\vest eorner (or Corner No. 2) of the .A..rn1strong "iron
mine" (Stipulation, Exhibit A, R. 33). With this condition existing, it is apparent that a hiatus existed
between the south boundary line of the ''iron Inine''
and the true south line of the Southwest quarter of
the Xorth,vest quarter of Section 32 aforesaid. This
hiatus has been denominated in the record of trial as
· · conflict area ' ' ( R. 96, 97) .
The patent to Thon1as J. Jones issued on August
12, 1912 conveyed the Cora No. 1 by metes and bounds
and fixed the location of corner No. 1 as being at a
point from which the quarter corner of Section 32 aforesaid is located South 79 deg. 09' West 839 feet distant
(R. 26). It will be thus noted that the location of the
West quarter corner of Section 32 aforesaid as set forth
in the Walker-Blair patent does not correspond with
the location as stated in the Jones patent. It is manifest by a comparison of the description of the ''iron
mine" contained in the W'alker-Blair patent with the
description of the commencement point of description
of the Cora· No. 1 lode claim that corner No. 1 of the
latter claim is 102 feet due West of corner No. 2 of
the Arn1strong Iron- Mine. Therefore, the ·Jones patent
would have covered the hiatus or ''conflict area'' had
not the Jones patent contained exceptions which eliminated it in the conveyance to Jones ( R. 26, 27, 28, 33)
The description in the Jones patent of the Cora
No. 1 first embraces an area contained within eight
courses. This area is shown on Exhibit A of the Stipu-
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lation (R. 33) in heavy white lines and the area is identified ~as "Cora No. 1 (amended) ". The patent however
contained important qualifications and exceptions which
serve in a radical manner to modify and limit the area
actually conveyed to Thomas J. Jones. Tiaken verbatim
from the patent, these qualifications and exceptions
read as follows:
''excepting and excluding from these presents
all that portion of the ground, hereinbefore
described, embraced in said mining claim, or lot
No. 48 and ·said southwest quarter of the northwest quarter of Section thirty-two except tract A
described as follows; Beginning at a point on
line 8-1 of said Cora No. 1 lode claim west 281.1
feet from corner No. 8; thence west 50 feet;
thence South 11 degrees 30' West 126.2 feet;
thence North 80 deg. 10' East 50.4 feet; thence
North 11 degrees 30' East 124.6 feet to the place
of beginning; and also all that portion of said
Cora No. 1 vein or lode, and all veins, lodes and
ledges, throughout their entire depth, the tops'
or apexes of w.hich lie inside of such excluded
ground; Survey No. 4797 extending 1273.6 feet
in length along said Cora No. 1 vein or lode; the
premises herein gran ted, containing 9. 725 acres,
more or less." (R. 27)
For a proper understanding of the operative effect
of the exceptions ·contained in the Jones patent and
their results, it is necessary to describe certain legal
proceedings and other matters which ensued concerning the ''conflict area''. Counsel for the app~ellee
Excelsior Iron Mining Company, in his opening statement summarized these proceedings as follows:
4
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''By conveyances from the patentee of the
..:-\.r1nstrong Placer and the Armstrong Mine the
predecessor of the plaintiff in this case, the Excelsior Iron l\Iining Company, became the owner
of the Armstrong Placer and the Armstrong· Iron
nline, and in 1904, in Case No. 522, in the United
States District Court for the District of Utah,
the Excelsior Iron ~fining Company as owners
.
Placer and the Armstrong Iron
of the . .\rmstrong
l\line brought suit to quiet title against Jones
to the conflict area. At the same time the Excelsior Iron Mining Company brought suits against
other individuals involving other areas within
the . .\.rmstrong Placer. There were four suits,
~o. 519, No. 520, No. 521 and No. 522 brought in
the United States District Court. At that time
bear in mind, your Honor, a patent had been
issued to the Armstrong Placer and Armstrong
Iron Mine in 1879, so that the patent had been
outstanding twenty-five years when the Excelsior brought this suit against Jones to quiet title
against him to the conflict area, and Judge
Marshall entered a decree in that case quieting
title to the conflict area. * * * Judge Marshall
quieted title to that conflict area in Jones.
" * * * The applicant and the locator of the
Cora. His location was then in good standing,
but he had not yet applied for patent, but the
conflict area was quieted in Jones.

"Subsequently and in the year 1906 another
suit in which the Excelsior sought to quiet title
to that same area was instituted in the United
States District Court fQr the District of Utah
and that is Case 1053. That case was p·artially
tried when a stipulation was entered upon and
it was agreed that Jones might patent this conflict area provided he would sell it after patent
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to the Excelsior Iron Mining Comp·any. Pursuant to that stipulation Judge Marshall made
and entered his decree in Case 1053 quieting
title to the conflict area in Thomas R. Jones.
Those decrees, however, did not in any way
adversely affect Excelsior's placer rights in the
conflict area.
' ' THE CouRT : You mean as placer mining
claims7
H. RAY: Yes, as placer mine claims.
The government having granted this placer
ground in 1879, it could not be granted again to
anybody else, but Judge Marshall pursuant to
the stipulation of the parties, decided that case
in favor of Jones, the locator of the Cora. Jones
then filed his application for patent to this area.
The proceedings had in the Federal Court would
indicate that the parties thought that it would be
a matter of six months or less before Jones could
acquire a patent covering this area, and particularly that ore body. But it was a matter of
several years before patent was actually received
and when Jones applied for his patent his application was rejected because he undertook to get
a patent to that entire conflict area, and that
brought into focus a rule of mining law which I
would like to remind your Honor :about. The
statute provides that if one applies for a placer
claim and within it there is a known lode he
must pay at the rate of $2.50 per acre for placer
ground and $5.00 an acre for lode location, but
since the placer rights covered the entire surface, the lode locator is limited to twenty-five
feet on either side of the lode taken as a line or
a total of fifty feet surface rights. Now, the
statute limits him to fifty feet of surface rights
so as to minimize the interference with the placer
"MR.

PAUL

6
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surf~ace

rights. Do I make 1nyself clear?

·'THE CouRT: That is only when the lode is
within the limits of the prior placer claim 7
''~lR.

PAUL H. RAY: Yes. The statute gener-

ally-the general statute, if your Honor please,
proYides that the lode locator may have 600
feet on the width and 1500 feet on the strike or
length of the claim. 600 by 1500. But when that
location is m·a.de \Yithin the placer claim the lode
is limited to fifty feet, it being the assumption
that fifty feet is enough surface right to ~permit
of the mining and removal of the entire lode.
··X ow, the courts have held, and we think
there is no authority to the contrary, that when
a stranger to the placer location locates upon a
known lode within the placer location he is limited to fifty feet of surface and that within the
ap:Qlication of that rule the Land Department
refused to give Jones a patent to the entire conflict area because the en tire conflict area lies
within the Armstrong Placer. So the patent he
finally got to the Cora was a tract fifty feet wide
within the conflict area indicated on this map
as Tract A, if the court please, and the survey
maps will indicate that the middle of that fiftyfoot tract is equidistant from the end lines of
the conflict area. So he got fifty feet in his
patent in the middle of the conflict 'area. Having
secured that patent he then called upon Excelsior Iron Mining Company, our predecessor in
interest, to pay the purchase price for this lode,
and our predecessor in interest said no, you
agreed to convey to us the entire lode as it
exists in the conflict area. This land here, our
people said to Mr. Jones, 'No, you can't sell us
that and get our money because our understanding was that we were going to get the entire

7
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lode.' So Mr. Jones or his successors in interest
sued us for the purchase price.

''MR. RITER: That was the C. F. & I.
"MR. PAuL H. RAY: That case is entitled Colorado Fuel & Iron Company against the Excelsior Iron Mining Company and E. 0. Howard,
and was filed in the United States District Court
for the District of Utah and is identified as Law
3044. The issue in that case was whether
C. F. & I., successor to Jones, was able to deliver
to us the ore body within the .conflict area.
"THE CouRT: Was C. F. & I. prede.cessor of
your companyY
"MR. PAuL H. RAY: No, they are the successor of Jones. They were the suc;Cessor of Jones
'and we as owner of this Armstrong Placer-Armstrong Mine-we had an agreement from Jones,
we agreed· on our part that Jones would sell us
the ore .body within that conflict area and we
.agreed we would pay for it. So when he got a
patent describing only 50 feet of surface area
we contended that we weren't bound to pay the
purchase price because he was not :able to deliver
to us title to that lode. That was litigated before
Judge Johnson, and contentions were made before
Judge Johnson with re'Spect to apex, hanging
walls, foot walls and so forth and so on~

"MR. W. W. RAY: And all of the surface, too.
' 'MR. PAUL H. RAY : And all of the surface.
Now, bear this in mind, your Honor, if that had
not been, if that conflict area had not been ~a part
of a prior valid placer claim, this area patented
to Jones would not have been fifty feet wide,
it would have been '600 feet wide and would
have covered the entire conflict area. The only
8
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reason it "·as fifty feet instead of 600 feet is
because it was in a prior, valid, subsisting placer
claim. If it hadn't been the law would have
required the Land Office to give the 600 feet in
width, but being in the p1acer claim there were
not only no requirements that he get 600 feet,
but there was a limitation to fifty feet. Fifty
feet 'vas all he could have, it being the policy
of the la'v that fifty feet in surface is adequate to
mine the entire lode. Jones came along in ,defense
and he said 'That fifty feet that I bought from
you on the surface gives you the entire lode.'
We said 'No, it gives us less than the entire lode
and nothing less than the entire lode will satisfy
your obligation to us.'
~'Judge

Johnson ruled against us. He entered
his decree holding that that fifty feet of surface
right carried with it the entire lode and that
when Jones conveyed us that fifty feet of surface he conveyed to us the entire lode.
''We made this contention before Judge Johnson: If that fifty feet of surface is all we get,
then one day somebody will make some locations
along here and deprive us of the ore body Jones
has agreed to sell us. And Judge Johnson said :
No, nobody will ever make a valid location upon
any part of that ore body because that fifty feet
carries that ore body with it, lock, stock and
barrel, and he so decreed. ''

(R. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102)
It w·as agreed at trial that by valid deeds of conveyance properly delivered :and recorded, plaintiff Excelsior Iron ~lining Company, a corporation, became and
ever since May 7, 1940 has been the owner of the Arm~trong Placer and Arn1strong Iron Mine (R. 26). Also,
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it was agreed at trial that plaintiff Excelsior Iron Mining Company, became and ever since May 7, 1940, has
been, and now is the owner of. all the property conveyed and patented by the United States Government
to Jones by patent above described in his favor dated
August 26, 1912 ( R. 28). The plaintiff, Utah Construction Company, a corporation, has been since June 11,
1946 in possession of the Armstrong Placer and Armstrong ''iron mine'' under a written agreement of lease
with its co-plaintiff, Excelsior Iron Mining Company
(R. 26).
Being advised and believing that the hiatus or
''conflict area'' was public do maiD: and subject to location under the mining laws of the United States and
the State of Utah, the defendant Justheim on April 30,
1949 entered upon said 'area and located the same as
Lucky, Lucky #1, Lucky #2 and Lucky #3 (R. 218, 219,
221-224, 235, 238-243). The location notices on Lucky
#1, Lucky #2 and Lucky #3 (Exs.- 6, 7, 8) were recorded
in the office of the County Recorder of Iron County,
Utah, and were at the trial received in evidence (R. 223).
The proof of location and recording of notice of location ·of Lucky and the approved patent survey (Survey 7221) was duly ;app·roved (Ex. 5, R. 243). The
marking on the ground of corners of these claims and
the placement in position of the discovery monument
with proper notices were also proved at the trial
(R. 237-244).
The defendant J ustheim also offered proof that
he had done required 'assessrnent work for the years
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1950 and 1951 on the four clain1s (R. 245, 246, Exs. 9,
10, 11, 12. 13, 14, 15, 16).

In August, 1949, the plaintiffs commenced an action
against the defendants aboved named to quiet title in
Excelsior Iron Mining Company (hereinafter designated
''Excelsior") as owner, to the ''conflict area". The
con1plaint particularly described the conflict area, alleged that the defendants claim an interest therein -adYerse to plaintiffs, but that such claim is without right,
and that the defendants have no right, title, estate or
interest whatever in and to said 'area or any part thereof
as against the title and right to possession by plaintiffs.
(R. 1, 2, 3). The defendants answered the complaint,
ad1nitting the corporate existence of the plaintiffs, but
denying all :Other allegations therein contained. At the
time of answering defendant Justheim served and filed
a cross-complaint which described the location by defendant Justheim of the Lucky, Lucky No. 1, Lucky No. 2
and Lucky No. 3 lode mining claim·s within t·he "conflict
area, '' alleged that the conflict area was public domain
under the mining laws of the United States of America·
at the time of said locations, subject to entry .by the
defendant Justheim, and alleged that the said mining
claims are valid, existing claims. Further the .said defendant and cross plaintiff J ustheim alleged that the plaintiffs
claim some right, title, claim or interest in or to said
premises consisting of said mining claims adverse to the
defendant and cross plaintiff Justheim. That such claim
was without right and that the plaintiffs and cross defendants have no right, title, estate or interest whatever
11
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in or to. said premises or any part thereof against the
title and right to possession of the defendant and cross
plaintiff J ustheim. The defendant and cross plaintiff,
Justheim prayed for judgment quieting title in him as
the sole and exclusive owner of said mining claims and
debarring plaintiffs and cross defendants from asserting
any claim whatsoever in or to .said mining claims or any
part thereof or to any ore or minerals lying in or upon
said premises adverse to the right, title, claim and interest of said J ustheim. (R. 6-10). The plaintiffs and
cross defendants replied to defendant Justheim's counterclaim denying that the conflict area was unoccupied,
unclaimed mineral land of the United States and denying
that the same or any part thereof was subject to location
under the laws .of the United States or otherwise. Said
plaintiffs denied that the defendant and cros.s plaintiff
J ustheim ever went upon and explored said premises
und -denied there ·ever was upon or within said pre1nises
any lode except the lode which was conveyed and ·patented
by the United States to the predecess-ors in interest of
the plaintiffs; denied that the defendant Justheim ever
made any discovery or location upon the conflict area;
denied that said J ustheim was ever in possession of the
claims· des·cribed in his cross complaint or ·any part
thereof, and denied that he ever prepared to work the
same. Further answering the cross compJaint the cross
defendants alleged that they were lawfully and rightfully in exclusive possession of said premises ~and that
the plaintiff, Excelsior, was at all times the lawful owner
of said property, subject to the rights of plaintiff, Utah
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Construction Company (hereinafter designated '' C·onstruction' ') as lessee of the same. As further answer
and defense the plaintiffs ·alleged that the conflict area
lies entirely within the limits of the Armstrong Placer
Claim, which comprises the Southwest quarter of the
North,vest quarter of Section 32, in Township 35 South,
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, in Ir'on
County, Utah.. Further the plaintiffs alleged that all
of the minerals lying within the conflict area lie within
the Armstrong Placer Mine and Armstrong Iron Mine
(designated by the Surveyor General as Lot No. 41) and
that Excelsior is the lawful owner of the Armstrong Placer
~line, the Armstrong Mine (Lot No. 41) and Cora No. 1
Lode Mine, and all of the minerals contained therein and
that Excelsior is entitled to exclusive possession thereof
subject to the rights of the plaintiff, Construction, as
lessee. (R. 12-14.) As a further answer and defense
plaintiffs and cross defendants alleged that for more
than 20 years prior to April 30, 1949 plaintiff Excelsior
was the owner of and in the open, adverse, notorious and
exclusive possession of the conflict area and that during
all of said time Excelsior and its lessee, Construction,
paid all taxes levied and assessed upon and against said
property. Further plaintiffs and cross defendants !alleged
that on April 30, 1949 and long prior thereto, Excelsior,
by its lessee, Construction, was actively working, operating and mining the property described in plaintiffs'
complaint and in the counterclaim and cross· complaint
of d~fendant Justheim iand that on said day defendant
J ustheim, after working hours and in the evening of
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said day, surreptitiously and without right, came upon
said property and pretended to -make lode locations
thereon. In elaboration of this allegation the plaintiffs
alleged that said locations were made upon mining land
which had theretofore been patented by the United States
to plaintiffs' predecessors in interest and were without
right or validity. (R. 14, 15.)
As a further -defense the plaintiffs alleged that the
counterclaim and cross complaint of defendant and cross
plaintiff J ustheim is barred by the provisions of Section
7, Chapter 2, Title 104, Utah Code 1943, and Section 8,
Chapter 2, Title 30, United States Code Annotated.
(R. 15.)
The defendants, Justheim and Gorlinski, and the
defendant and cross plaintiff Justheim served and filed
their rejoinder to plaintiffs' and cross defendants' answer, which denied the principal affirmative allegations
of s'aid_answer and alleged that on the 30th day of April,
1949 and for a long period prior thereto the plaintiff,
Excelsior by its less~e Construction entered upon the
conflict area and removed ore and minerals therefrom
without the consent of the United States of America
and without the consent of defendan-ts and without the
·consent of the defendant and cross plaintiff Justheim.
The said reply reaffirmed the validity of the location
of the Lucky, Lucky No. 1, Lucky No. 2 and Lucky No.
3 lode mining claims and the ownership thereof by the
defendant :and cross plaintiff Justheim and alleged that
the plaintiffs were trespassers upon the public domain
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,vithout right or title. The prayer of said reply affirn1ed
the prayer of the defendants and of the defendant and
cross plaintiff Justheim contained in his cross complaint.
In order to eliminate time and effort in making
proof ·of certain undisputed facts in this case counsel
for plaintiffs and counsel for defendants and cross
plaintiff Justheim entered into a formal written stipulation (R. 22-32) wherein are set forth verbatim the
patent to Walker and Blair covering the Armstrong
Placer and .A. r1nstrong ''iron mine'' ( R. 22-2'6) and the
patent to Thomas J. Jones covering Cora No. 1 mining
claim (R. 26-28). By said stipulation it was further
agreed that the plaintiff Excelsior, by valid deeds of
conveyance, ever since May 7, 1940, h.as been the owner
of the Arn1strnog Placer and Armstrong ''iron mine'',
and that the same has been under lease to Construction
ever since June 11, 1946. It was further agreed that
the plaintiff Excelsior, by virtue of valid deeds of conveyance, has been since May 7, 1940, .and is now the
owner of all the property conveyed and patented to
Thomas J. Jones under the patent covering the Cora
No.1 mining claim; that Jones and his wife quitclaimed
and conveyed to the predecessor in interest of plaintiff
Excelsior all their right, title, claim and interest in and
to the conflict area; (R. 28-29) that ·plaintiff Excelsior
is now and ever since May 7, 1940 has been the owner
of all the right, title and interest in said property which
belonged to Jones and wife prior to the delivery of
said quitclaim deed. It was further agreed that on May
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7, 1940 'a certain corporation known and designated· as
Excelsior Iron Miriing Company, a Wyoming corporation, sold and conveyed to plaintiff Excelsior certain
mining property in Iron Springs Mining District in
Iron County, Utah, particularly described. Included
in the description is the ·~rmstrong Lode Mining Claim,
United States Lot No. 41, all that part .and portion of
the Cora Lode Mining Claim, Survey No. 4791, lying
~and being within the Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of Section 32, Township 35 South, Range
12 West, Salt Lake Meridian, and .als-o the Armstrong
Placer. (R. 29) It was further .agreed that plaintiff
Construction, since June 11, 1946 has been and now is
in the lawful possession of all property particul'arly
described above which belongs to plaintiff Excelsior.
(R. 29).
T~he

stipulation then sets forth the claim of plaintiff,
Excelsior, as follows :
(a) That by reason of the conveyance from the
Wyoming corporation it is the owner of all ores and
minerals lying upon or within all mining gr·ound bounded
by the boundary lines of Armstrong Placer and that
the defendants have no right, title or interest therein.
{b) That plaintiff Construction claims that as
less.ee it is and .at all times since June 11, 1946 has been
lawfully entitled to occupy and possess all of the property conveyed to pl'aintiff Excelsior by the Wyoming
corporation and to mine and remove all ores and min-
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erals lying upon or within the same, free of any claim
whatsoever of either of the defendants.
By said stipulation plaintiffs and each of them
deny that the conflict ~area was open to lode location
by the defendants and deny that defendants ever m.ade
any valid or la,Yfnl mining location upon s·aid property
or any part thereof. The stipulation further sets forth
that the defendants and the cross pl,aintiff Justheim
deny that the plaintiffs or either of them became or
are the o\vner or entitled to possession of the ores or
minerals lying upon or in the property described in the
notices of location by the defendant and cross plaintiff
Justheim and particularly known and designated 'as
Lucky, Lucky No. 1, Lucky No. 2 and Lucky N·o. 3, and
it is recited in the :stipulation that the defendants allege
and assert that on April 30, 1949, they made valid lode
locations on the conflict 'area.
There were attached to said stipulation and made
a part thereof certain exhibits. Exhibit B is a true
and correct copy of the field notes and survey plat
of the Armstrong Mining Claim made by Ferdinand
Dickert. Exhibit C is 'a true and correct copy of the
field notes of Cora No. 1 Lode made by Mayhew H.
Dalley. Exhibit D is a true .and correct copy of the field
notes of the Amended Survey of Cora No. 1 Lode made
by Guy Sterling. The fact that these exhibits are true
copies of what they purport to represent is admitted
by the stipulation for the purpose of relieving defendants and cross plaintiff Justheim from proving their
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~authenticity,

but the facts stated ·therein and the competency, relevancy and materiality of said exhibits or
either of them or any part thereof, are not admitted
and their admissibility as evidence in this case for any
purpose was reserved for ruling by the court. Each
party particularly reserved the right in said stipulation
to present and introduce .at the trial of the :action other
and additional testim~ony and evidence. (R. 30-31).
It was agreed that the issues to be determined by
the court were :

(a) Was any part of the land described in paragraph 12 above [the areas described in the four notices
of location made by defendant and cross plaintiff Justheim] or the ores or minerals therein open and subject
to lode location by defendants on April 30 1949.
(b) If said land or the ores or minerals upon or
therein were subject to location on the 30th day of
April 1949, did defendants or either of them make a
valid location upon said land or any part thereof. (R.
31-32).
By agreement of counsel the said ~action was tried
on November 9, 10 and 17, 1951, in Salt Lake County,
Utah, before the Honorable Will L. Hoyt, Judge of the
District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State
of Utah, in and for Iron County. (R. 94-95).
Thereafter on February 11, 1952, the said court
made, entered and filed its Findings of Fact ~and Conclusions of Law. (R. 70-83) The Findings ·of Fact. may
be summarized as follows:

18
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Finding No. 1 : The verbatim rep~oduction of the
patent covering the Armstrong Placer and Armstrong
Hiron 1nine", dated Decen1ber 16, 1879, to Walker and
Blair. ( R. 70-73).
Finding No. ~ : By valid deeds of conveyance properly delivered and recorded, plaintiff, Excelsior Iron
Mining Co1npany, a corporation, became and ever since
the 7th day of ~lay, 1940, has been the owner of the
Arn1strong Placer and the Armstrong ''iron mine''.
(R. 74).
Finding No. 3: By the terms of a written lease,
plaintiff, Utah Construction Company, is and ·ever since
the 11th day of June, 194'6 has been in the lawful possession of said Armstrong Placer and said Armstrong
"iron mine". (R. 74).
Finding No. 4: The verbatim reproduction of the
patent ·covering the Cora N·o. 1 Mining Claim dated
August 26, 1912, to Thomas J. Jones. (R. 74-76).
Finding No. 5 : By valid ·deeds of conveyance prop...
· erly executed, delivered ~and recorded, plaintiff, Excelsior Iron 1\tlining Company, became and ever since
the 7th day of May, 1940, has been and now is the owner
of all the property conveyed and patented by the United
States Government as hereinbefore in paragraph 4 :set
forth. (R. 76).
Finding No. 6: In his notice of lode location and
in his ~application for patent of Cora No. 1 Lode,
Amended, Thomas J. Jones included a portion of the
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Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of Section
32, Township 35 South, Range 12 West, which portion
particularly describes an area me.asuring approximately
135.1 feet North and South-on the West line thereof and
114.1 feet on its East line, 'and 600 feet in breadth [the
same being the conflict .area]. ( R. 76-77).
Finding No. 7 : The area described in paragraph
6 next ahove was included in the Armstrong Placer
claim patent to Joseph R. Walker and Jediah M. Blair,
as set forth in finding 1 above. Such area or parcel of
land was referred to upon the trial as the ''conflict
area'', and is the 'area or parcel of land particularly
involved in this case. (R. 77).
Finding No. 8: The four lode_ locations referred
to in defendant Justheim's cross complaint and counterclaim, and as to which said cross-plaintiffs pray for a
decree quieting title in him as against the plaintiffs,
are described and identified as Lucky, Lucky No. 1,
Lucky. No.2, and Lucky No. 3. All four of said claims
located by defendants lie entirely within the conflict
area a·s described in finding 6 above. (R. 77).
Finding No. 9: That portion of the surface of the
conflict area which was conveyed by U. S. Patent referred to in finding 4 above was referred to· and identified upon the trial of this case as "Tract A". (R. 77).
Finding No. 10 : The ore body involved in this case
is roughly elliptical in shape, app·roximately 960 feet
long and from 100 to 300 feet wide, and extends lengthwise from 'a line or point about 300 feet south -of the
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area here involved, thence Northeasterly into and
through the Lucky claims and Tract A, and thence
~ortheasterly for at least 400 feet through the· Armstrong lode, Lot 41, as the same is described in finding
1 above. (R. 77).
Finding N·o. 11: Said ore body was, prior to its
being mined by plaintiffs, a body of iron bearing rock
in place embedded in a troughlike depression with its
walls converging as they descend. (R. 78).
Finding No. 12: On April 30, 1949 and for a long
time prior thereto, the plaintiff, Utah Construction Company,., was and had been engaged in mining and removing ore from the conflict area, including the area
embraced within the Lucky lode locations .and within
Tract A. On said day plaintiff, Utah Construction Com~
pany, 'Yas and ha·d been engaged in mining and removing ore from the conflict area including the area embraced 'vithin the Lucky lode locations and within
Tract A. On said day, plaintiff, Utah Construction Company, had about fifteen men working with heavy equipment mining and removing ore from the op·~n pit extending over and including the discovery point and most of
the area embraced within the Lucky locations. (R. 78).
Finding No. 13: After the men working and mining the said area had quit for the day on the evening
of Ap·ril 30, 1949 and after they had left the place of
work, defendants went upon the workings in said ore
pit and posted their notices of location of the Lucky,
Lucky No. 1, Lucky No. 2 and Lucky No. 3 lode mining·
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claims, marked the corners of said claims, and thereafter
recorded copies of such notices of location. (R. 78).
Finding No. 14: At the time of the posting ·of notices
of location of the Lucky claims there w.as one, and only
one, oody of mineral bearing rock in place outcropping
in the area elll:braced in said claims, and it was the same
ledge which extended into Armstrong Iron Mine lode
claim, Lot 41. Said ore body was als·o the same ledge
or body of ore which extended into the Cora No. 1 lode
claim. (R. 78).
Finding No. 15 : The discovery of the Cora No. 1
lode claim is located at or near the intersection of the
center line of Tract A with the south boundary of Tract
A (being the south boundary of the Southwest quarter
of the Northwest quarter of Section 32, Township 35
South of Range 12 West, Salt Lake Meridian; which
is the Armstrong placer ·claim). The said discovery
of the Cora No. 1 lode claim as amended is located upon
the same lode or deposit of iron upon which the pretended discovery of each of the Lucky claims was
marked. (R. 78).
Finding No. 16: Since ~about January, 1948, plaintiff, Utah Construction Company, as lessee of plaintiff,
Exeelsior Iron Mining Company, ha.s been developing,
working and mining the ore body lying within the conflict area, -and have (sic.) removed large quantities of
ore therefrom. At all times while so mining said property plaintiffs have claimed to be the owners of both
the surface of said area and the ·ore body contained
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therein. Neither of the plaintiffs nor the plaintiffs'
predecessors have been working the ore body in controversy continuously for a. period of seven years next
prior to . A. pril 3, 1949. ( R. 79).
Finding No. 17: The entire area attempted to be
located by the defendants as lode claims Lucky, Lucky
No. 1, Lucky N·o. 2 and Lucky No. 3, is within the Southwest quarter of the N orth,vest quarter of Section 32,
Township 35 South, Range 12 West, S·alt Lake Meridian, being the area covered by the 'P~atent to the Armstrong placer claim set forth in finding 1 above.. That
lode or body of ·ore, being the body of ore involved in
this case, was clearly visible on the surface .and was
known to exist at the time of the application for p~atent
to the Armstrong placer, and was intended to he described in, and covered by, ·description of the Armstrong
Iron Mine, Lot No. 41, but because of an error in the
survey which attempted to establish·th~ south boundary
of said southwest quarter of the northwest quarter of
said Section 32, the ground in controversy was not
covered by the metes and bounds description of the
Armstrong lr·on Mine, Lot No. 41, and therefore, by
inadvertence, the conflict area was not described in
the U. S. Patent as a part of the Armstrong Iron Mine,
Lot No. 41, lr·on Springs Mining District, Iron County,
Utah. (R. 79).
Finding No. 18: Plaintiff, Excelsior Iron Mining
Company, as successor in interest of J.oseph R. Walker
and J ediah M. Blair, patentees in the patent referred
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to in finding 1, and as successor in interest of Thomas
J. Jones, patentee in the patent referred to in finding
4,. succeeded to all of the rights ·of said patentees, and is
the owner of the entire area ·described in finding 6 and
referred to as the ''conflict area'', including the entire
surface thereof, and all the ores · and minerals lying
upon or within said area. (R. 79-80).
Finding No. 19: The lode or vein lying within the
Armstflong Iron Mine, Lot No. 41, and within the conflict area, including the four Lucky ·claims and ''Tract
A'', is a single indivisible lode or body of ·ore, and the
discovery within Tract A lies upon the apex of said
lode or vein. (R. 80).
From said Findings the court concluded:

1. The body of ore herein involved was a single
lode within the meaning of the United States Mining
Law. (R. 80).
2. The outcrop on ''Tract A'' was part of the
apex of said lode, and the discovery on the Cora No. 1
lode amended was on such apex within the meaning of
the mining laws. (R. 80).
3. Whether the ore body contained within the conflict area and within the area embraced by the four
Lucky lode locations passed from the United States
by patent referred to in Finding 1, or by force of the
patent to Thomas J. Jones, referred to in Finding 4, the
court concludes that plaintiff, Excelsior Iron Mining
Company, as successor in interest of Joseph R. Walker
24
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and Jediah M. Blair, patentees of the Armstrong placer
clain1 and the Armstrong iron mine, Lot No. 41, and
the success-or in interest ·of Thomas J. Jones, patentee
of the Cora N·o. 1 lode as amended, is the owner_ of all
the land described in plaintiffs' con1plaint and in Finding 6 iof the foregoing findings, including .all of the
surface thereof, and all of the ores or minerals lying
upon or 'Yithin said land. The ownership and right of
plaintiff, Excelsior Iron Mining Comp-any, is subject
only to the rights of its lessee, Utah Construction Company. (R. 80).
4. On April 30, 1949, the area embraced within the
four Lucky locations 'vas not open to location under the
mining laws of the United States or the State of Utah
by ~defendants, or anyone else. Such area was not public
domain, but that each and every part thereof, together
with .all the mirierals lying upon or therein, was and is
the property of plaintiff, Excelsior Iron Mining Company, subject only to the rights of its lessee, the plaintiff, Utah Construction Company. (R. 80-81).

5. Plaintiffs are entitled to the decree of this court
quieting their title as against defendants to the entire
conflict area, including all of the area embraced within
the four Lucky claims. (R. 81).
6. The defendants are entitled to take nothing by
their cross complaint or counterclaim, and ·plaintiffs
are entitled to have judgment a.s prayed, with their
costs. (R. 81).
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Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and C-onclusions of Law, the court, on February 11, 1952, made,
entered and filed its judgment wherein and whereby it
adjudged and decreed that the plaintiff, Excelsior, subject only to the rig_hts of its lessee, Construction, is the
owner :and entitled to the p-ossession of the conflict area.,
and decreeing that the defendants had no right, title
or interest in and to the same. Title to said conflict area
was by said judgment quieted in plaintiff, Excelsior,
subject only to the rights of its lessee, Construction.
(R. 82-83).
Within the time allowed by law and the rules -of
court, defendants served and filed their notice of appe~l (R. 85) and designation of record on appeal (R.
86-87). In lieu of a cost bond the defendants deposited
with the Clerk of the trial court $300.00 in cash funds.
(R. 88). Thereafter the plaintiffs designated an additional -portion of the record. (R. 90). On March 7, 1952,
the record on ap-peal was filed in the office of the Clerk
of the Supreme Court.

ARGUMENT

I.
THE EXISTENCE OF THE "CONFLICT
AREA" ARISING OUT OF DISCREPANCIES IN
THE SURVEY OF THE ARMSTRONG IRON
MINE IS PROVED BEYOND DISPUTE AND
IS ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE PLAINTIFFS.
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"""-\.s heretofore stated, the patent from the United
States Government dated September 16, 1879 in favor
of ''"r"alker and Blair, conveying the Armstrong placer,
also embraced a description of the Armstrong ''iron
mine·' designated as Lot ±1 by the Surveyor General.
It embraced 1.76 acres. In describing the "iron mine"
the patent f:L~ed the quarterly section corner on the
westerly boundary line of Section 32, Township 35 South,
Range 1~ ''rest, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, as bearing
west 790 feet from the southwesterly corner of the ''iron
mine," or its corner No. 2 (R. 23). Manifestly, this
\\yas an error of the Surveyor General. When he made
the survey for the Cora No. 1 lode claim, he discovered
that the description contained in the Walker-Blair patent was erroneous. The south line of the Armstrong
placer claim (being the south line of the sout·hwest quar~
ter of the north\v-est quarter of Section 32 aforesaid) did
not correspond with the ·south line of the Armstrong
''iron mine.'' The west quarter corner of Section 32
was not due west of the southwest ·corner of the ''iron
mine" as described in the Walker-Blair patent. The
correct survey proved that said quarter corner was
located south 79° 09' west 839 feet from corner No. 1
of the Cora No. 1 lode claim, which corner No. 1 ·was
102 feet we'St of the southwest corner (or corner No. 2)
of the Armstrong ''iron mine'' (Stipulation Exhibit
"A", R. 33). The plaintiffs, in their opening statement
to the court, explain the ere a tion of the ''conflict area''
in the following manner:
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'' * • • When the patent issued to the Armstrong Placer and the Armstl}ong Iron Mine it
described the Armstrong Iron Mine as extending southerly to the southerly border of the
Armstrong Placer, which is the section line,
quarter ·section line. Now, when Mr. J.ones in
1902, that is thirty years later, located upon the
Cora No. 1 and the survey was made of the Cora
No. 1 that survey indicated that the Armstrong
Iron Mine .came only to this point (indicating on
map) which is 135 feet north of the south line of
the ArmstJ:ong Placer.
''THE COURT: How do you read that it
indicates that~ Was the description in the patent
to the Armstrong Mine, did the description in
the patent extend to the 40 line, or not~
''MR. PAUL H. RAY: The surveyor who
surveyed for the Armstrong--or for Jones, said
no it didn't. So that there then arose a conflict
area in here. This 135 feet became conflict area.
Plainly this 135 feet is clearly within the limits
of the Armstrong Placer. The question then arose
whether it also overlapped the Armstrong Iron
Mine. As I stated to your Honor, the Cora No. 1
lode was ·described as involving 135 feet which had
been ~shown on this patent plat as a part of the
Armstrong Mine.
''So, for my purposes at this point, it is simply
important for your Honor t·o understand that
this became conflict area. Thereafter there began
litigation involving what is known as the conflict area. ' ' ( R. 97)
Plaintiffs' Exhibit ''A'' cle:arly demonstrates the
existence of the "conflict area" and the causes for the
existence of the same. The description of the Armstrong
28
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~·iron

Inine, '' or Lot 41, contained in the Walker-Blair
patent (Stipulation R. 23), ,,~hen read in connection
'vith the delineation on Plaintiffs' Exhibit "A," shows
clearly that the "·esterly and ea.sterly boundary lines
of the ·~iron n1ine '' did not extend to the south boundary
line of the . .\rmstrong· placer claim, but the southerly
termini of these lines 'vere approximately 135 feet
northerly of the south boundary line of the placer claim.
This situation is further reiterated by the plat marked
Exhibit '•.A_'' attached to the stipul!ation (R. 33).
Plaintiffs' Exhibit •'K'' also demonstrates this hiatus.
Defendant's Exhibits "4'' and "5" correctly correlate with the plaintiffs' exhibits hereinbefore mentioned
and there results therefrom an accord and agreement in
the proof as to the existence of the ''conflict area.''
The litiga,tion which ensued and which is described
by plaintiffs' counsel in his ·opening statement, excerpts
from \Yhich have been hereinbefore quoted, further iconfirms the fact that the error in survey of the WalkerBlair patent and the description of the Armstrong
"iron mine" contained in that patent have long been
known and have been the subject of periodic dispute
between interested parties.
Defendants assert that this evidence conclusively
proves that the description of the Armstrong ''iron
mine'' contained in the Walker-Blair patent did not describe that part of the mineral deposit contained in the
"conflict area" and that therefore the discussion of
interesting legal problems involved in th~s case must
con1mence upon this undisputed .premise. For conveni29
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ence of the court, appellants have prepared from the
·evidence and exhibits in this case a plat which, among
other things, demonstrates the ''conflict area.'' This
plat is inserted as a centerpiece of this brief.

II.
THE QUITCLAIM DEED EXECUTED AND
DELIVERED BY THOMAS J. JONES AND EVA
L. Ji0 NES, HIS WIFE, DATED APRIL 29, 1916,
TO EXCELSIOR IRON MINING COMPANY, A
WYOMING CORPORATION, PREDECESSOR IN
TITLE OF THE PLAINTIFF EXCELSIOR IRON
MINING COMPANY, CONVEYED TO THE
GRANTEE THEREIN NAMED i0 NLY THE
RIGHT, TITLE AND INTEREST OF THE GRANTORS IN AND TO THE DEPOSIT OF MINERALS
CONTAINED WITHIN THE "CONFLICT AREA"
OWNED BY JONE,S AT THE DATE OF THE
CONVEYANCE.
1

1

At page 23 of the abstract of title (Plaintiffs' Exhibit
"AA") is shown 1a quitclaim deed dated April 29, 1916,
wherein Thomas J. Jones and Eva L. Jones, his wife,
are grantors, and Excelsior Iron Mining Company, a
Wyoming corporation, is grantee. Subsequently, by a
mining deed, shown at page 28 of Plaintiffs' Exhibit
'' AA, '' the said Excelsior Iron Mining Company, a
Wyoming corporation, conveyed to the plaintiff Excelsior Iron Mining Company, among other properties,
"all that part or portion of the Cora lode mining claim,
Survey No. 4791, lying and being within the southwest
30
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quarter of the north\vest quarter of Section 32, Township 35 South, Range 12 ''Test * * * together with all
other property or rights or interests of s~aid ·corporation.'' The description contained in the deed from
Thon1as J. Jones and Eva L. Jones, his wife, to the
,,. .yo1ning corporation describes all of the "conflict
area,'' excepting therefrom, however, Tract ''A.''
By separate quitclaim deed dated April 29, 1916,
sho,vn at page 23 of plaintiffs' Exhibit "AA," Thomas
J. Jones and Eva L. Jones, his wife, conveyed to the
\\. .yoming corporation Tract A (Plaintiffs' Exhibit A;
Defendants' Exhibits 4 and 5 }.
Defendants' located mining claims Lucky, Lucky
Xo. 1, Lucky No. 2, Lucky No. 3 are situated in that
part of the ''conflict area'' westerly of Tract A. There
can be no dispute over the proposition that if Thomas
J. Jones had no right, title, claim or interest in and to
that part of the lode mineral deposit contained in the
''conflict area" upon which defendants' claims are
located, that his quitclaim to the Wyoming corporation,
plaintiffs' predecessor in title, vested in the Wyoming
corporation no right, title, claim or interest in the mineral deposit, and hence plaintiffs would have none (18
C.J. Deeds, Sec. 264, p. 291 ; 16 Am. J ur. Deeds, Sec.
326, p. 622; Patton on Titles, 1938, Sec. 122, p. 408).
In this connection it should be specifically noted that
in the prior litigation involving the "·conflict area" no
decree of court has ever been entered which quieted th(title in the plaintiff Excelsior Iron Mining Company or
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its predecessor in interest of the ''conflict area'' against
Thomas J. Jones. The decree in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the District of Utah, in Equity Action
No. 522, entitled "Excelsior Iron Mining Company vs.
Tho1nas J. Jones," (Plaintiffs' Exhibit "T") specifically quieted title in Thomas J. Jones in and to the ''conflict
area." In the action instituted and prosecuted in the
Circuit Court of the United States District Court for the
District of Utah by Excelsior Iron Mining Company vs.
Thomas J. Jones, being Equity Action No. 1053 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit "U"), although based upon stipulation of
counsel (Plaintiffs' Exhibit "S "), nevertheless quieted
title in Thomas J. Jones in the ''conflict area.'' The
judgment entered in the United States District Court for
the District of Utah, wherein Colorado Fuel & Iron Company was plaintiff and Excelsior Iron Mining Company
was defendant, being Law Action No. 3,044 (Plaintiffs'
Exhibit "X"), was an action based on -contract and did
not attempt to quiet title in any person, firm or ·corporation. It adjudicated merely that there-. had been a substantial performance of the contract in litigation by the
plaintiff therein named. Therefore, the conclusion
seems irrefutable that if the plaintiff in this action, Excelsior Iron Mining Company, has :any title in and to the
mineral deposit in that part of the ' 'conflict area'' upon
which defendants' mining claims are located, that such
finding must depend upon Thomas J. Jones having such
title as would lrave passed to plaintiffs' predecessor in
title, the Wyoming corporation, by virtue of the quitclaim
deed described above (P'· 23, Plaintiffs' Exhibit "AA").
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III.
THE PATENT TO THOMAS J. JONES FROM
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DATED
AUGUST 26, 1912 (STIPULATION R. 74, 75, 76)
SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED THE CONFLICT
AREA, EXCEPT TRACT A, INSOFAR AS THE
CORA NO. 1 LODE MINING CLAIM IS CONCERNED.
The federal patent dated August 26, 1912, whereby
the United States Government conveyed to Thomas J.
Jones the Cora No. 1 lode mining claim, describes this
claim by metes and bounds. The ,description of this
claim a.s contained within the patent is delineate-d upon
Exhibit "A" of the stipulation (R. 33) in heavy white
lines. Commencing with corner No. 1 of the ·clain1, the
description involves eight courses and eight ·corners.
There is then contained within the description the pertinent exceptions which hereinbefore have heen set forth
in this brief, but which for convenience are now repeated:
''excepting and excluding from these presents all
that portion of the ground, hereinbefore described, embraced in said mining claim, or lot No.
48 and said southwest quarter of the northwest
quarter of Section thirty-two except tract A
described as follows; Beginning at a point on
line 8-1 of said Cora No. 1 lode claim west 281.1
feet from corner No. 8; thence west 50 feet;
thence South 11 degrees 30' West 126.2 feet;
thence North 80 ·deg. 10' East 50.4 feet; thence
North 11 degrees 30' East 124.6 feet to the
place of beginning; and also all that portion of
~~
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said Cora No. 1 vein or lode, and all veins,
lodes and ledges, throughout their entire depth,
the tops' or apexes of which lie inside of such
excluded ground ; Survey No. 4797 extending
1273.6 feet in length along said Cora No. 1 vein
or lode; the premises herein granted, containing
9.725 acres, more or less." (R. 27)
In reading these exceptions, it is necessary to refer
to the first course of the description of the lode mining
claim, reading as follows:
'' Thence, first course, south 11 o 30' west, 135.1
feet intersect the south line of the Southwest
quarter of the northwest quarter of Section
thirty-two in Township t~rty-five South of Range
twelve west of the Salt Lake Meridian, The
Armstrong Placer Claim at South 88° 10' West
570.5 feet from the .Southeast corner;. 434.8 feet
intersect line 1-2 of lot No. 48, The Little Allie
Lode Claim, at North 49° West 350 feet from
·corner No. 2; 435.7 feet to corner No. 2, a cedar
post four and one-half feet long, four inches
square, marked 2-4797 in mound of stone;''

(R. 27)
The exceptions. first exclude from the conveyence
all that portion of ground hereinafter described (being
the description of the Cora No. llode mining claim) ''embraced in said mining cl!aim or Lot 48' '. The first ·course
of the description above quoted referred to Lot 48, which
is the Little Allie lode mining claim. This part of the
excepted area embraced in the Little Allie lode mining
claim is shown in pink upon the insert plat in this brief.
This area consists of 5.002 acres (Stipulation Exhibit
"D" and Defendants' Exhibit 3). The second exception
34
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embraces all that part of the Cora No. 1lode mining claim
included in the south,vest quarter of the northwest
quarter of Section 32 aforementioned, except Tract A.
Clearly this includes the ''conflict area'' which is situate
in the said quarter section sho,vn in yellow on insert
plat. This area excluded from the operative effect of the
patent 1.571 la~res (Stipulation Exhibit "D"; Plaintiffs'
Exhibit '' 3'': R. 58). The area of Tract A is 0.141 acres
(ibid.).
The total area of Cora No. 1 lode mining claim as
amended was 16.157 acres (ibid.). Subtracting from this
total acreage the area of the Little Allie lode mining
claim, or 5.002 acres, leaves 11.155 acres. The second
excluded area equals 1.430 acres (1.571 acres total excluded area, less area of Tract A, .141 acres). Subtr:acting the
net acreage of the second exclusion of 1.430 acres from
11.155 acres leaves 9.725 acres, the exact area conveyed
by the Cora No. 1 p•atent (Stipulation R. 27). This computation removes any ambiguity (if any exists) in the
Cora No. 1 patent to Jones, and proves beyond any
question that the ' 'conflict area' ', except Tract A, was
not patented to Jones.
The course of the litigation which ensued and which
has been particularly above described (Plaintiffs' Exhibits "S" "T" "U" "V" '' W" "X") clearly shows
'
'
'
'
'
'
that the Jones patent has been construed and interpreted
by plaintiffs' predecessor in title, the \Vyoming corporation, as excluding the ''conflict area'' except Tract A. A
strange situation is here presented. By plaintiffs' own
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

evidence its ·predecessor in title took the solemn legal
position in a United States court (Exhibits 'V", "W",
"X") that the patent to Jones excluded the "conflict
area'' except Tract A and yet in this case the plaintiff
E:x:celsior Iron Mining Company reverses the position
which its immediate predecessor in title assumed (p 28,
Plaintiffs' Exhibit "AA") and contends that this same
patent conveyed to Jones the identical mineral rights
which its predecessor in title on a 'Separate occasion
contended oppositely.
Supported by this record of l~tigation and by the official computation of areas involved, the defendants assert that Jones, by virtu,e of the federal patent, obtained
no title to that part of the ''conflict area" occupied by
defendants' locations, unless there is operative some
rule of law applicable to this case that declares otherWise.

IV.
P'LA·T AND FIELD NOTES REFERRED TO
IN PATENTS IS.SUED BY THE UNITED
STATES MAY BE RESORTED TO· FO·R THE
PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE LIMITS OF
THE AREA THAT PASSED UNDER SUCH
PA'TENT. THE PLAT WITH ALL ITS NOTES,
LINES, DES.CRIPTIONS, AND LANDMARKS
BECOMES AS SUCH A PART OF THE GRANT
OR DEED BY WHICH THEY ARE CONVEYED
AND CONTROLLED SO FAR AS LIMITS ARE
36
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCERNED AS IF SUCH DESCRIPTIVE
FEATURES WERE WRITTEN OUT IN THE
PATENTS.
Attached to the stipulation are the field notes and
plats made by deputies of the United States Surveyor
General in support of the Armstrong patent and of the
Cora No. 1 patent. It is 'vell settled that a reference in
a patent to the official plat and surveys make such plat
and field notes of such survey

''a part of the description of the land granted as
fully as if they were incorporated at length in
the patents." (U.S. Company vs. Larsen, 134
Fed. 769, affd. 207 U.S. 1; 52 Law Ed. 65; 28 S. Ct.

15)
"The plat and field notes referred to in
patents have been referred to frequently by the
courts to determine matters of boundary. The
question of a reference to the field notes f.or the
purpose of construing the patent to a group of
mining locations has not heretofore been resorted
to. So far as we are advised we can see no reason
why such reference may not be made. The real
boundaries of the several conflicting locations
may be determined only by a knowledge of the
exclusions of the territory in conflict between
them." (Round Mountain Mining Co. vs. Round
Mountain Co., 36 Nev. 543; 138 Pac. 173, Rev.
35 Nev. 392 ; 129 Pac. 309)
''We are satisfied that evidence that the field
notes, as the regulations of the department required, showed marked posts at the third and fourth
corners was admissible and that witnesses properly were allowed to testify that they found posts
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upon the ground.'' (Silver King Coalition Mines
Co. vs. Conkling Mining Co., 255 U. S. 151; '65 Law ·
Ed. ·561; 41 S. Ct. 310)
'rhere can be, therefore, no question but wnat tne
court is entitled to consider the field notes submitted
by the defendants by way of the stipulation. These field
notes conclusively p·rove the respective areas of the original Cora No. 1 lode mining claim, the Little Allie mining claim, the ' 'conflicted :area' ' and Tract A.

v.
THE EVIDENCE C·ONCLUSIVELY SHOWS
THAT THE SO-CALLED ARMSTRONG "IRON
MINE" AND THE DEPOSIT OF ORE INVOLVED
IN THIS ACTION IS A BLANKET OR HORIZIO,NTAL VEIN HAVING NO APEX AND NO
DIP. NO EXTRALATERAL RIGHT ATTACHES
TO A HORIZONTAL OR BLANKET VEIN FOR
THE REASON THAT SUCH A VEIN HAS NO
"COURSE DOWNWARD" AS DESCRIBED IN
THE FEDERAL STATUTE. SUCH VEIN THUS
FORMS A TOP, AND WILL SUPPORT A VALID
LOCATION·
At the trial, the plaintiffs introduced evidence covering exploration and development conducted by them on
the mineral deposits involved in this action. Particular
attention is invited to Plaintiffs' Exhibits "L" and
'' M' '. Exhibit '' L'' demonstrates the cross-section of the
Armstrong ore body, showing the p·robable structure as
determined by diamond drilling. Exhibit "M" shows
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cross-sections of the ore body looking northeast. These
exhibits n1ust be kept. before the court in considering the
testimony of ~lr. Earl F. Hanson and Mr. A. Lee Christensen, t"·o of the expert and professional witnesses presented by the plaintiffs at the trial. The pertinent parts
of the testimony of these \vitnesses are hereinafter
summarized.
E.A.RL F. HANSON
~Ir.

Hanson is a mining engineer and geologist (R.
107.) His professional \Vork since graduating from the
University of Utah has been that of geologist (R. 107)
and in particular he has acted in a consultant capacity
"ith reference to the iron fields in southern Utah (R.
108). In 1944 he was consulted regarding the titles to the
mining properties of the Excelsior Iron Mining Company, plaintiff herein (R. 108). On September 15, 1944,
he first entered upon the Armstrong "iron mine" (R.
109). He described the deposit in the following manner:
''A. The outcrop of the ore body which we call
the Armstrong was very rough. The outline. was
fairly regular, sort of elliptical but the ~outcrop extended high into the :air, as cliffs and boulders. and
to get a picture of it one had to walk across over
cliffs to examine it for its· apparent impurities;
and it was easy to see the apatite crystals which
contained phosphorus minerals.
·
Q. Would you hesitate long enough to translate that for us, what you mean by apatite
crystals?
A. Apatite is a mineral containing phosphorus, and when }Jtresent in Iron ore in such quantities, say about thirty-five thousandths of one per
39
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cent, makes it unsaleable, undesirable in the furnace, and in the Iron Springs area it is the controlling factor, whether or not the material is ore, as
much of it contains too much phosphorus to be
marketable. And so my visit was largely to see
by inspection whether or not this particular body
looked like it could be mined and the ore sold.

* * * * *
A. The Armstrong outcrop is visible in almost
any direction excepting from the west for a distance, a long distance, as it is the high point on
the east face ~of the main range.
,

Q. When you say ''longdistance'', you mean
in feet, or can you see it for several miles'
A. Yes, sir, it is visible from Cedar City, a
distance of more than ten miles.

* * * * *
A. A general examination of the Armstrong
ore body, as I told you, indicates that it is a high
phos ore body, and the Bureau of Mines sampling
of the surface indicated that it was essentially
high in phosphorus, but it is :a magnetite mineral,
hard and desirable and that type of ore brings a
slightly higher price than the softer ores. And it
was decided to investigate more thoroughly than
the Bureau of Mines had just what the actual content of this body to be. We thought surely somewhere there must· be ~some low phos-phosphorus
ores there that might be mined.'' (R.l09-110, 112,

114)
Mr. Christensen described tihe exploration work conducted by him in the Arm.strong ''iron mine'' commencing in the autumn of 1947 (R. 115 ). It consisted of wagon
40
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drill holes and diamond drilling (R. 115). Wagon drill
holes are shallo'v exploration holes ( R. 115). These holes
are drilled normally to a depth of about 25 f·eet. The apparatus used is portable and n1ounted on rubber tires
and can be pulled over the surface and easily set up. The
drill holes are usually located at 25-foot intervals in
order to detennine variations in the grade of ore (R.
116). The dian1ond drill is a rotary machine. It has a face
of small diamonds, "~hich rotates and cuts a ·core which
is held in the core barrel and can be removed. Diamond
drilling produces an actual ore sample of the rock itself,
which is used in analyzing the ore. By an examin~a~tion
of the core from the diamond drill the nature of the
n1aterial penetrated and the thickness of the stratum -can
be determined (R. 116). A diamond drill can penetrate
the earth for a limitless distance (R. 116). Ordinarily a
hole is drilled through the ore body and into the formation
beyond "'far enough to be sure that there isn't another
occurrence of ore within a reasonable distance" (R. 116).
Mr. Christensen had knowledge of the actual results of
analyses of the diamond drill cores (R. 117).
In 1948 the witness was employed by the Utah
Construction Company, one of the ·plaintiffs (R.
114), as a full-time geological engineer, and. at that time
production operations of the Armstrong "iron mine",
including the "conflict area", commenced (R. 117-121).
While the "\vitness "\vas on the stand, the plaintiffs
introduced in evidence a series of photographs marked
Exhibits '' B" to "J' ', inclusive (R. 128, 136-137, 138, 139,
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140). These photographs present views of the mineral
deposit in the area of the Armstrong "iron mine" and
of the "~conflict area". The witness was asked to describe
the nature of this ore body. The following was his testimony:
''A. The ore body is a continuous mass with an
outline as shown on the exhibit. It is somewhat U
shaped, in that the east side dips to the west and
the west side dips to the east. The ore is massive
and continuous and made up largely of the mineral magnetite, and contains apatite, ~some quartz.

Q. Does it have converging walls at depth f
A. Yes, sir.
Q. That is, the Wialls tend to come together at
depth~

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Would you say .as to whether that has the
elements of a trough, that is, the walls~
A. Yes, it does have that trough shape. It has
somewhat of 'a flat bottom to it." (R.128)
Upon cross-examination the
curred:

followin~

colloquy oc-

Q. On the ·other hand, I take it from your experience, learning .and skill that you are able to
form very definite opinions as to the geological
conditions in that area.
A. Yes, I have my own opinion regarding the
geology.
Q, You have heard Mr. Christensen's testimony with respect to this deposit or trough. Do
you agree with that'
A. I do.
42
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Q. I think I aJu quoting correctly, y-ou heard
the testimony that it is trough in shape in the
.ordinary sense of the word as you have used it,
a hanging "~an, foot wall. Do you agree 'vith that f
A. I do.
Q. What would be your des-c:ription of this
deposit!
.A. I confirm Dr. Christensen's general description.
Q. Well, then, I take it that the word "apex"
in this kind of thing has no p~roper application.
A. That is my understanding of an ore body
which ·does not conform to planes.
Q. In other words, you could not get"apex"
out of this case~ That is your theory~
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Your opinion ~
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I am using that, of course, in our general
understanding of practical mining law, but of
course this deposit would have strikes along the
long axis, wouldn't it~
A. It has a long demension. When we define
strike, it has reference to a plane and a dip to a
plane.
Q. You say that condition does not exist~
A. No sir, both sides of that are warped surfaces. They are not a plane, and they are inclined
to be irregular.
Q. Of course, I realize we are getting over into
the field of hypothetical conditions. But on the
other hand, I think it is a fair question to ask
you, do you think this trough that existed some
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tin1e in prehistoric times was either filled in by
the ore deposit, or displacement~ How did the ore
get in there~ I am sure we would all be interested
. in your opinion. How did that produce that~

A. To quote from Dr. Mackay who has made
a study of the Ir·on Springs and the Iron County
ore deposits over a period of a number of years
and his published account to the Utah State
Geological Society, he sets it up something like
this. That the ore probably came from the Monzonite; that the Monzonite is in general form
laccolith.
Q. A
A.

wh.at~

A laccolith.

Q. Would you spell that?
A. It is l-a-c-c-o-1-i-th. A description of a
laccolith is, a mass of igneous rock intruded into
sedimentary rocks, arches the bed above a floor,
leaving the sides flanked by sedimentary rocks
dipping away from the igneous mass.

Q. Now, what is that sedimentary
is it ·classified, if you know~

rock~

How

A. The sedimentary rock in this area are considered to be or' Pennsylvanian age, and they represent several formations, of which the Homestake
limestone and the Pinto sandstone are two of the
principal members.

Q. You have heard Dr. Christensen say he
didn't know of any Homes take limestone in this
·area. Am I correct in that~
Q.

I mean conflict area.
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.\. I don't kno'v of any outcrops of Homestake limestone in the conflict area or near to it, the
closest being Lindsay Hill.
Q. How far a\Yay is thatv?
A. That is at lea,st a quarter of a nrile.
Q. '''ell, when you say a quarter of a mile
away, doesn't that n1ean the Homes take limestone
is displaced by the mineralized bodyo? Or is that
an erroneous statement?
A. Will you repeat the question again please 1
Q. Was the Homes take limestone a quarter of
a mile away from the disputed area displaced by
the intrusion of the mineralized ore body, iron ore
body?
..:\... I am afraid it will take considerable discussion to bring out why there isn't Homestake limestone present in the disputed area. It is not
present.
Q. And it ·has not been replaced Y
A. No, it has not been rep~la.ced.
Q. Well, if it didn't replace the Homestake
limestone, how did it get there'
A. It replaced the Pinto :sandstone, calcareous
members within the Pinto sandstone.
Q. Is that true a quarter of a mile 1away?
A. No. The Lindsay ore body is distinctly ·different from the geological aspects.
Q. I wish you would without being too elaborate, just make a distinction between the disputed
area and a quarter of a mile away. You say. there
is a distinction between the two deposits.
A. The first state, the minerals of the two
deposits are different, the Armstrong ore body
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being made up chiefly of magnetite, and the Lindsay ore body being made up ·chiefly of hematite.

Q. What is the difference between those two
types~
"
A. The difference as far as our considevation
is concerned is mainly one of hardness, and the
hematite being softer ore and the magnetic being
the harder ore.

Q. All right, of course there is a difference in
the chemical composition.
A. In the chemical composition.
Q. You say in the disputed area it wa.s the
Pinto sandstone that was displaced, is that right Y
A. It is-I beg your pardon~
Q. Am I corre·ct on that~ Correct me, because I don't want to misquote you.
A. Will you repeat the question 1
Q. In the disputed area it was the Pinto sandstone that was displaced~
A. Replaced. I made the statement that the
-Pinto sandstone was replaced.
Q. Replaced by mineralized-by mineralization~

A. Yes, sir.
Q. How would that process occur!
A. The mineralizing solution which probably
came out of the Monzonite replaced molecule by
molecule the adjacent country rock and left a deposit of magnetite.

Q. Well, it wasn't a ·chemical process that took
place then, such as the replacement that would
take place in the limestone.
46
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.-\.. I think it would be a parallel situation; in
one case you have limestone replaced, in the other
you have a calcarous sandstone.
Q. ''rell, is that a chemical process1
A. Yes, sir.
Q. \\:ell, then, it means that the sandstone
'vould be dissolved, wouldn't it Y
"'"-\.. That is a che1nical problem that would
also take a lot of explanation to go into just how
replacement takes place.
Q. Suffice for our purpose-no need to take up
the record-suffice for our purpose the Pinto
sandstone is replaced by the mineralized body by
chemical action in the disputed area.
A. Yes, that appears.
Q. Didn't that leave the hanging wall-the
foot wall~
A. No, sir. If you take a lump of sugar and put
a drop of water on it or a drop of ink, you might
get an example of what might happen when mineralizing solution ·comes in contact with something it can react with.
Q. Is that what occurred here?
·A. In a similar way, I believe that is what occurred.
Q. Well now, is the silica in Pinto sandstone
soluble in the sense the limestone is'
A. Not soluble in the sense, but there are calcareous members-by ·calcareous, I mean containing lime-and a considerable proportion of lime,
and those members are replaceable.
Q. Is that what occurs?
A. It is my idea in this particular area we do
have a calcareous-
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Q. Well, do you have a predominance of the
calcareous content above the ·sandstone, is that the
idea?
A. Yes, I would think the lime content there
would be higher than the sulphur content.
Q. When water comes in contact with that 7
A. I don't follow you there, sir.
Q. Well, what would bring about the dissolution, placing in solution the calcareous members
of the sandstone, unles·s it would be waterY
A. There are other ways of conveying miner.al
than water. Water is only one way. It might be
transported by gases; it might be actually ejected,
in a sense, almost viscous materiaL
Q. For our purpose then, either by water, or
gases, or even acid ground_ water might have done
it, is that correct!
A. It was transported into this particular
sedimentary bed.
Q. Notwithstanding that f·act, it didn't leave
the two walls, the hanging and the foot waJ.l, did
it! In other words, ·simply the trough.
A. It spread out where preparation had been
made either due to fracturing or due to probably
prefolding and naturally it would follow the line
of least re·sistance.
Q. Well, did it hit a fault line in there! Any
evidence of faulting!
A. Very little evidence of faulting.
Q. It couldn't have gotten in the fault1
A. Very little, there is some little peeling off
on the easterly side against the :sandstone, but it
does not represent a crushed zone such as a fault
would be. And furthermore, the material forming
48
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the east 'vall of sandstone looks exactly like some
of the inclusions within the ore.''

A. LEE CHRISTENSEN
:Jir. Christensen is a geologist and engineer, having
received his Bachelor of Science degree in geological engineering fron1 the lTniversity of Utah, his Master of
Arts fron1 Stanford University in 1928, and his Doctor of
Philosophy in geology from the University of California
in 1942 (R. 14:2). He was employed by the Utah Construction Company, one of the plaintiffs in this action, in 1945
as a geologist, although he had previously served this
company in a consultant capacity (R. 142). In June, 1945,
he commenced his investigation ·of the iron deposits in
the Iron Springs mining district in Iron County, Utah
(R.143). The witness prepared plaintiffs' Exhibit'' A''),
being a compilation from maps in the United States
Land Office :and it shows the Armstrong placer, the Armstrong ''iron mine'', Cora No. 1 lode, and the ''conflict
area" (R. 144). The witness defined the "conflict area"
as being an area measuring approximately 135 feet north
and south and 600 feet east:and \Vest (R.145). In October,
1947, the \vitness made a detailed investigation of the
Armstrong ''iron mine'' (R. 146, 147). As a part ·of the
process there \Vere eleven wagon drill holes of an average depth of 30-35 feet, and on N.ovember 10, 1947, diamond drilling began (R. 148). Six diamond drill holes
of v:arying depth from 150 to 200 feet were made. In
each case the aim was to drill completely through the ore
body into the formation, either to the side or under-
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neath. These drill holes penetrated the ore body (R. 148,
149.) The purpose of drilling the nineteen holes was to
delineate and define the ore body (R. 149). On the basis
of the information obtained from the drill holes, plaintiffs' Exhibit '' K'' (R. 150) was prepared under the
direction of the witness. This map shows the surface
contours of the area and is related to a set of coordinates described by the witness as follows:
Q. What do you mean when you say a set of
coordinates?

A. Well, in the drilling we had to have some
way of locating the drill holes, and we set up two
sets of coordinates at right angles to each other.
They were not north and south. They were roughly northea'St-southwest and southeast-northwest.
The reason for doing that was in preparing sections .of the structure and also in drilling for the
'Structure, we aimed to get our sections at right
angles to the ore body and the coordinates were
laid out in that fashion.'' (R.150)
Plaintiffs' Exhibit '' L'' was also· p~repared under
the direction ,of Mr. Christensen (R. 151). Exhibit "L" is
a ·Series of cross-sections taken at intervals of -approxiimately 100 feet !a,t right angles to the strike of the orebody. In the upper right-hand ~orner of the plat there
is a figure underneath which is written "850 X". This
refers to the arbitrary set of ·coordinates which had been
established on Exhibit "K". The figure "750 X" on
Exhibit "L" is a coordinate that is a distance northeast
100 feet. The figure "650 X" is another coordin!ate an
additional 100 feet distance. These figures on Exhibit
50
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••L" are the coordinate8 taken from Exhibit '~I(". There
is a series of cross-sections at 100-foot intervals across
the ore body. Five of these rross-sections are shown on
Exhibit '· L' '. The first is 850 X and the last is 350 X500 feet are inYolved in this cross-section ( R. 152.) The
cross-sections of. the ore body in the 'conflict area'' run
obliquely across same. Tract A lies roughly between
850 X and 750 X. In ref·erring to Exhibit ''L'' and crosssection 850 X, the \vitness described the monzonite and
sandstone depositions as follows :
4

"A. Well, Monzonite is a rock strongly
resembling granite and in ordinary appearance.
And it is an intrusive rock which is believed formed from a molten mass and crystallized :at some
depth.
Q. On the right-hand side of the section you
have the space colored yellow and it says 'Sandstone'.
A. That refers to a whitish or light tan or
yellow sandstone material which in some cases is
locally altered to quartzite. In other case'S it may
be almost a white powder. It is extremely variable
in texture.
* * * *
Q. Generally the Monzonite 1s to the west.
A. Generally. You never find it east of the
ore body.
Q. Never east of the ore bed, and on the east
of the sandstone. Now, what is the pink that lies
between the Monzonite and the sandstone~
A. The pink is the ore body.
Q. That is the ore body as it appeared in this
outcrop and as it appears in this conflict area 1
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A. It is. The shape of the ore body is inferred
from the drill holes and the available surface information." (R.153, 154)
.
The witness deseribed in detail the method followed
in demonstrating the size and shape of the ore deposit
on Exhibits "L" and "M" by correlating the results
produced by the drill holes (R. 155-157). Exhibit "L"
shows the size and shape of the ore body -vvithout reference
to mining operations and it was made some months prior
to mining (R. 159). It wa~ a prelimin'ary estimate to indicate the quantity of or~e which might be expected to be
produced by open-cut methods. (R. 159). Exhibit ''M''
shows the extent of the orebody that is developed by
actual mining operations (R. 160). A comparison of Exhibit "M" with Exhibit "L" shows a close correspondence, although there were differentations (R. 161, 162).
The exhibits demonstrate that the ore body is bounded
on the east by sandstone and on the west by either Monzonite or s!andstone, and that it r~ests up·on sandstone
( R. 162 ). The witness, as a mining geologist, characterized this ore body as follows :

''A. Well, it could be described as roughly elliptical in shape, with its greatest extent northeastsouthwest. In cross sectional outline it is sort of
a truncated V, you might say. In other words, our
drilling has indicated that the bottom is flat or
gently sloping and as you actually observe it has
a series .of sections, the depth varies from place
to place. It has a somewhat irregular bottom.
Q. Is it fair to say that the isides which enclose
this body of ore converge as they go down~
A. Yes.
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Q.

Throughout its length!
Throughout its length, that is character-

...\.
istic.
Q. So that the sides consisting of sandstone
and Monzonite form a trough within which this
body of ore lies, is that right¥
A. Yes, a trough 'vith rather irregular bottom,
and generally fla.t or gently sloping.
Q. What is the greatest width .of the ore body 7
A. OhA. (sic) I didn't mean in feet, but with relati{)n to the top or bottom, where is the greatest
width1
A. The greatest width is at the top·.
Q. So that this ore body as it lies between
those converging sides is wider at the outcrop or
top than it is at depth?

A. Yes.
Q. And ,does the width diminish generally, as
both sides go down!
A. The width in all cases diminishes. There
are no overhanging contacts, as far as we have
found." (R.162, 163)

Cross-examination of this witness produced the following pertinent and relevant statements:

'' Q. * * * All right, now, from the descriptions on Exhibits M and L, is this typ~ical exhibit
-was there a typical ore body that· possessed an
apex!
A. I would think not.
Q. I wish you would elaborate that statement,
it is interesting.
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A. I would describe it roughly as elliptical
body, sort of a V shape, with an irregular flat
or gently sloping bottom which varies somewhat
in elevation as you go along the land. It is more
of a trough~
Q. It has a definite strike, however, hasn't it?
A. Well, it has a greater length than-that is,
it is elliptical and you can say its greatest length
is the ·strike, but it doesn't have a strike as you
ordinarily discuss with veins or bedded sediments.
It doesn't have a qefinite plane surface. Neither
of the contacts, or I wouldn't say· any of the contacts, you can't refer to just two, there is a bottom
to it, also, but none of them can be described as
plane surfaces, although the southeast has a general plane surface in some places, but as you map
and as you follow along·in the mining there are
changes, curves, or swells.
Q. You, of course, referred to U. S. G. S.
Survey Bulletin 338.

A.

You mean the one by Leath and Harter~

Q.

Yes.

A. Yes.
Q. In describing that ore body did they describe it in ·different terms of strikes and dips?
A. Well, I would say this with due respect to
both Leath and Harter. The investigation was
made a long time ago; they didn't have any of the
available evidence that we have now; and with
transportation what it was, I think they did a good
job, but certainly their conclusions could be modified. I would not accept the conclusions as they
drew them in that bulletin, no.
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Q. And you won't accept them, Mr. Christensen, I :assume, because ·of your research and work
in diamond-wagon wheel and diamond drilling?
A. Well, we made it a point-it is a little different when you are just writing about something;
but when you write on it and people are going to
spend son1e money mining it, you have to be fairly sure of your conclusions. And although I was
aware Qf both the work of the Bureau of Mines
and the earlier w.ork of the U. S. Geological Sur..
vey, and I accepted their conclusions with an open
mind, nevertheless, when I found facts which
changed my opinion I had to be realistic about
them; I had to take the facts as I found them.
Those facts as you say you found them,
they disagree with the early U.S.G.S. description~
A. Yes, they differ materially with the-even
the recent exploration of the U. S. Bureau of
Mines. For one thing, in both of those explorations they ·show Monzonite in contact with the ore
throughout the length, while there is a v-ery considerable body of sandstone that is easily recognized.
Q.

Y.ou mentioned that where it comes in from
the northwest, did you~
A. Toward the northeast.
Q.

Q. It croS'ses over the ore body, does
A. No, it goes parallel with it.

it~

Well, it produces the condition of putting
the sandst·one between the ore body and the Monzonite!
Q.

A. Yes, it sort of wedges out; it is, you might
say, a lense shaped body running essentially
parallel "\\rith the ore body but toward the south-
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west end it pinches out and the Monzonite there
comes in direct contact with the ore.
Q. Well, then, would you say that this deposit
had any dip to it, the way you have described it?
A. No.
Q. You used the word ''dip''.
A. No, I didn't,-you can refer to the slope of
the walls ·and you ·sometimes use it as the term dip
in a rough sort of way, I might have mentioned
that in my previous testimony, but I don't think
that that ore body has a well defined strike or dip.
I don't think it is a plane surface.
Q. Well, now, is that eonfining your remarks
to this here, would you call this a vein In a
classical sense?
A. No.
Q. You wouldn't 7
A. No, I would not.
MR. PAuL H. RAY: Cla:ssical1
MR. RITER : Yes.

Q.

Class it between a hanging and a foot wall t

A. I would refer to it as a replacement type
of ore body. Now it is true that in the ·district,
with this one exception, nearly all the other ore
deposits are in limestone, which is much more
readily replaced ch·emically than this one is, but
this has all the .other fe~atures that go with it. You
can find fragments of the unreplaced country rock
in the ore itself. We found a number of ·cases of
that in the diamond drilling, and there is 'Some
apparent in the wall as you see it on the north..
west face. You can still see some ·of those masses
of unreplaced country rock. In its form, general
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character, I \vould ·say that this ore body has a
strong re'Semblance to the others, in th·a.t they are,
you might say, elongated pods.
Q. N O\V, I want to ask you this. Isn't the
Homestake limestone definitely replaced by the
ore body, and it has a. f.oot wall and hanging wallY
MR.

' r·

:JIR.

RITER :

\Y·. RAY: In this Y

In this.

A. I don't think the Homes take is in it: I
don't think it is anY"!here around it.
Q. Are you sure about that, is that your statement!

A. I have never found any easily recognized
limestone. There is quite a little calcareous sandstone, but any of this material found in this vicinity has no resemblance to the typical Home-stake
limestone. There may be pods or areas, lenses of
limestone, but I would not put this in with the
Homestake limestone.
Q. Then your theory of this mineralized
trough deposition is replacement~
A. I would call it replacement, yes.

Q. Then you think the trough primarily existed through the function of nature, it was filled
in some time by the mineralized deposit, is that
y·our theory1
A. Well, I can't say very much about how it
was formed. I can say pretty much what I think it
is, what its form is. But :any supposition you make
on how it was f.ormed is pure inference. Nobody
was there when it happened

Q. The trough as you have explained that, is
there. Now, in y·our cross s·ection, the thing stands
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out, has irregularities, you come down to 750 and
.. the 350, it looks as if it is lying in a trough, doesn't
it~

A.

Yes.

Q. Is it a reasonable or unreasonable inference
to believe that that trough existed and was filled
in~

A. No I don't think it is. I don't know what
that trough was.
Q. Well, wasn't, as a rna tter of fact, the limereplaced by the iron~ Isn't that reasonably
certain 7

~stone

A. Well, I don't know why you would say
limestone if there is no evidence of it now. In
nearly all the other ·cases where we have had limestone replace it by iron, we found ·evidence of the
limestone itself.
Q. Well now, you have indicated 750X as the
cross section within the disputed area.

A. Well, the disputed area would lie roughly
between 850 :and 750 X.
Q. And 750.
A. As I remember they run oblique.
Q. Now, !want you to state, between those two
cross sections is there any type of ore deposit to
the east'
A. I would say definitely not. If you are going
to have strike 'and dip you have got to have a
definite pJane formed of the ore body which this
doesn't have.

Q. Because of the trough formation, is that
the sequence of your statement?·
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~

A. VVhen I \vent into this thing I was open
1ninded about \vhat its shape might be. I had no
particular conclusion whether it was a vein or
whether it was a trough or what it was. I went
in purely to find out what its shape might be so
that 've could determine the outline of the pit and
if possible 1nineable ore and the shape as I have
developed it is based largely on connecting points
of the kno,Yn composition or elevation. Now, in
this case, on 850Exhibit what 1
A. Exhibit M. I also refer back here. In this , ,
case 850-Q.

Q.

Exhibit L?

Exhibit L. I had the ·contact between the
Monzonite and the ore. That was readily apparent.
It was sharp enough that you could actually
straddle it and have o.ne foot on one material and
one on the other. So this location wasn't any particular place. We knew from drill hole No. 6 which
was entirely ore, the ore extended .down at least
that far. We knew that from Bureau of Mines
drill hole No. 18, that it extended down to the
points indicated on the map--that is the color, and
I prolonged with a dotted line the known outcrop,
missing drill hole No. 6 which was entirely in ore,
and coming down to the intersection on the
Bureau of Mines hole 18. In the same way I connected these points. Now, actually that shape may
vary considera.bly. We found when we mine these
things they don't come out exactly as plane surfaces. Rather they are undulated. And in the same
way I connected the outcrop on the southeast side
where there was a rather marked cliff and the
S'an.dstone contact or point we found there in drill
hole No. 5 where there was a sudden change from
-L<\..
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the ore to the ·sandstone. When you talk about the
dip of the ore body, I don't think you can refer to
it that way, because it has· no plane shape, that
is when you refer to strike and dip you refer to a
plane surface, or something is bound-

Q. You are really talking
terms, :aren't you?

in

geometrical

A. Yes. Now, in this case you can put in a lot
of hypothetical structures here about the sandstone, but actually when you get out in the field
'that sandstone is s-o shattered ~hat you can't tell
which is bedded, you can 't-in other words, you
can't mark this as a strike.
What I want to know from you, referring
.back to Exhibit A, where do you place this ore
body-is it on the purported Lucky location~ It
isn't, is it 7 (R. 172-178)
Q.

A.

The Lu·cky location falls within it, yes.

On redirect examination, Dr. Christensen testified
that the defendants' locations !and also Tract A lie on

one homogeneous ore body (R. 180), and upon recrossexamination the following ~colloquy occurred:
Well, it is true, Mr. Christensen, that this
ore body itself ha:s, as you said, no dip to it, isn't
it a matter of fact that it does, let's use the word
slop~e, to the east and southeast~ That is what my
question of the high point of deposit was 1aimed at.
'' Q.

MR.

PAUL H. RAY:

MR.

RITER :

MR.

PAUL

MR.

RITER :

Upon the

surface~

No, as disclosed by his research.

H. RAY: Surface slopes, the surface?
Yes.
60
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A. The surface, yes, slopes to theQ. Well, is that true of the ·ore body itself?
A. No.
Q. Well, it demonstrates it-doesn't it show
that very definitely on the exhibits by these cross
sections. Perhaps I am wrong, correct me if I am.
A. Those are taken at certain various points.
Actually it is a trough somewhat like this.
Q. Yes.
A. With a bottom that varies from pl:ace to
place. In other words, it comes down here and
made a depression and down here and made a
depression.

Q. Well, wouldn't the ore body itself ·on Lucky
No. 3 be lower in elevation than on the Lucky~

MR. PAUL H. RAY: You mean on the
MR.

RITER :

Q.

On the surface, that is true.

surface~

On the surface.

A. That the ground itself in each case-the
slope of the .ore on the surface, is toward the
southeast.
Q. Well, you say the slope of the ore on the
surface. Why wouldn't that be true of the slope
of the ore when you get into the interior~
A. Well, because what you have is an irregular mass which has been trunca.ted by erosion so
that I don't think you could say the ore has any
particular slope." (R.l80-182)

1. The court committed prejudicial error in
finding that the apex of the mineral deposit was
within Tract A and in attaching to Tract A extra-
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lateral rights. That part of Finding 19 which
declares that the discovery within Tract A lies upon
the apex of the lode or vein is not supported by
substantial evidence, but is in contradiction of
plaintiffs' own evidence. Conclusions of Law 1 and
2 erroneously apply the law of ·extralateral rights
to said deposit.
Germane to the discussion that follows is the following Federal statutory enactments:
''Mining claims upon veins or lodes -of quartz
or other rock in place bearing gold, silver, cinnabar, lead, tin, copper, or other valuable
deposits, located p~rior to May 10, 1872, shall .be
governed as to length ~along the vein or lode by
the customs, regulations, and laws in force at
the date of their location. A mining claim located
after the lOth day of May 1872, whether located
by one or more persons, may equal, but shall
not exceed, one thousand five hundred feet in
length ralong the vein or lode, but no location of
a mining claim shall be made until the dis·covery
of the vein or lode within the limits of the claim
located. No claim shall extend more than three
hundred feet on each side .of the middle of the vein
at the surface, nor :shall any ~claim be limited by ·
· any mining regulation to less than twenty-five
feet on each side of the middle of the vein at the
surface, except where adverse rights existing on
the lOth day of May 1872 render such limitation
necessary. The end lines of each claim shall be
parallel to each other. R.S. § 2320. '' (U.S.C.A.,
Title 30, Sec. 23)
"The locators of :all mining locations made on
any mineral vein, lode, or ledge, situated on the
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public domain, their heirs and assigns, where no
adverse claim existed on the lOth day of May
1872 so long as they comply with the laws of the
United States, and with State, territorial, :and
local regulations not in conflict with the laws of
the United States governing their possessory title,
shall have the exclusive right of possession and
enjoyment of all the surface included Within the
lines of their locations, and of all veins, lodes,
and ledg"es throughout their enti:r~e depth, the
top or apex of which lies inside of such surface
lines extended down"\vard vertically, although
such veins, lodes, or ledges may so far depart
from a perpendicular in their course downward
as to extend outside the vertical side lines of
such surface locations. But their right of possession to such outside parts of such veins or ledges
shall be confined to such portions thereof as lie
between vertical planes drawn downward as above
described, through the end lines of their loea tions,
so continued in their own direction that such
planes will intersect such exterior p·arts of such
veins or ledges. Nothing in this section shall
authoriz.e the locator or possessor of a vein or
lode which extends in its downward course beyond
the vertical lines ·of his claim to enter upon the
surface of a claim owned or possessed by another.
R.S. § 2322. '' (U. S. C. A., Title 30, Sec. 26)
' 'Claims usually called 'placers,' including
all forms of deposit, e~cepting veins of quartz,
or other rock in place, shall be subject to entry
and patent, under like circumstances and -c-onditions, an·d upon similar proceedings, as are
provided for vein or lode ·claims but where the
lands have been previously surveyed by the
United States, the entry in its exterior limits
shall conform to the legal subdivisions of the
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public lands. And where placer claims are upon
surveyed lands, and ·Conform to legal subdivisions,
no further survey ·Or plat shall be required, and
all placer-mining claims located after the lOth
day of May 1872, shall conform as near as p·racticable wit;h the United States system of publicland surveys, and the rectangular subdivisions
of such surveys, and no such location shall include
more than twenty acres for each individual claimant; but where placer claims cannot be conformed
to legal subdivisions, survey and p1at shall be
made as on unsurveyed lands ; and where by the
segregation of mineral land in any legal subdivision a quantity of agricultural land less than
forty :acres remains, such fractional portion of
agricultural land may be entered by any party
qualified by law, for homestead purposes. R.S.
§§ 2329, 2331; Mar. 3, 1891, c. 561, § 4, 26 Stat.
1097. (U.S.C.A., Title 30, Sec. 35)
''Where the same person, association, or
corporation is in possession of a placer claim,
and also a vein or lode included within the
bowndaries ther.eof; application shall be made for
a patent for the placer .claim, with the statement that it includes such vein or lode, and in
such case a patent shall issue for the placer claim,
subject to the provisions of sections 21-24, 26-30,
33-48, 50-52, 71-76 of this title, including such
vein or lode, upon the payment of $5 per acre
for such vein or lode claim, and twenty-five feet
of surface on each side thereof. The remainder
of the placer claim, or :any placer claim not embracing any vein or lode claim, shall be paid for
at the rate ·of $2.50 per acre, together with all
costs of proceedings ; and wher.e a vein or lode,
such as is described in section 23 of this title, is
known to exist within the boundaries of a p~lacer
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cl(J;int, an application. for a patent for such placer
clain~ which does not include an .application for
the ·rein or lode claim shall be construed as a conclusive declara.tion that the claimant of the placer
claim has no right of possession of the vein or
lode cla-im; but where the existence of .a vein or
lode in a place1· cla·i1n is not known, a patent for
the placer claim shall convey all valuable mineral
and other deposits within the boUJndaries the.reof.
R.S. § 2333. (U.S.C.A., Title 30, Sec. 37.
Emphasis supplied.)
The testimony of plaintiffs' witnesses, Hanson and
Christensen, discloses and proves that the mineral
deposit here involved is not a conventional vein or lode
between a hanging wall and foot wall. These witnesses
were emphatic that it has no dip or strike and tliat it
is ·without an apex. It is a body of ore located within
a truncated trough. Mr. Hanson testified that the ore
body does not conform to planes a:nd that there is no
apex involved in the deposit. Without planes there can
be no aiJ~ex, is a fact asserted by this witness in response
to :several questions.

Likewise, Dr. Christensen testified that it is a body
of ore elliptical in sh!a1pe with its greatest extent northeast and southwest, an·d with its greatest width at the top.
Dr. Christensen emphasized the fact that it possesses no
apex and has no dip. While it is a consolidated body of
ore and is one deposit, it represents a subterranean
intrusion which the forces of na,ture laid down from the
process of replacing sandstone with mineralized eleInents. The form and extent of the deposit are demonstrated on plaintiffs' Exhibit "K", "L" and "M."
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It is the contention of the defendants that this deposit is a blanket or horizontal or bedded deposit of ·ore
and that the law of ·extralateral rights under Section
26, Title 30, U. S. C. A. (R. S. ~ 2322) cannot be applied
to same. The following quotation, taken from American
Mining Law by A. H. Ricketts of the San Francisco Bar,
printed in February 1943, under the dire·ction of the
Division of Mines, D·epartment of Natur.al Resources of
the State of California, elucidates the position of defendants in this case.
''Blanket vein or horizontal, or bedded, is a
term applicable to ta hosizontal vein or deposit
which may have no distinct apex. The apex of such
vein is regarded as coextensive with the space between the side lines, -and every ·part or point of
such apex as much the middle of the vein as any
other part. A bl:anket vein is one where the ore
body covers the entire area within the limits of
the side and end lines of the location. The right to
an entire vein or lode can not be asserted under
a location covering a part only of its width, and
the location is only good f.or the part within the
lines extended vertically downmard. A blanket
vein or lode has no extralateral rights but should,
however, be located as a lode ·claim. '' (§ 145,
p. 122)
Mr. Lindley, in his discussion of "broad lodes" contained in his monumental Treatise on American Mining
Law, Third Edition, makes the following revelant statement.
''Before leaving the subject of 'broad lodes'
it may be well to call attention to certain classes
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of deposits which in their occurrence 1are 'broad, '
and by reason of being in place 1nay fall within
the definition -of 'lodes,' but 'vhich at the same
time may not be susceptible of being carved up
into numerous surface locations upon which extralateral rights may be predicated. We may take,
for example, ,,·hat are familiarly .called the 'copper porphyries,' zones of impregnation, replacement, or secondary enrichment caused by denudation and leaching. These zones cover large
areas, sometimes a mile or more in length by a
width of a thousand or n1ore feet. At times they
are :surrounded by rocks of different character.
But their boundaries, so far as mineralization
is concerned, are, generally speaking, -commercial ones, on all sides, top and bottom. Zones
of this character have no dip or downwar'd
course, in a legal sense. Nor hawe they an apex, except, perhaps, theoretically, such as the land department for executive purposes establishes in the
case of blanket deposits. The mineral-bearing rock
is homogeneous throughout, it is true. But to apply the extralateral right doctrine of bisected
apex and 'broad lode'S' to this character of deposits would be an .absurdity.

''As was said by the supreme court of Utah in
the case of Grand Central Min. Co. v. Mammoth
M. Co.:'What constitutes a discovery that will
validate a location is !a very different thing
from what constitutes an apex, to which attaches the statutory right to invade the possession of and apprOJ}riate the property
which is presumed to belong to an adjoining
owner.'
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''For the purpose of sustaining the V!alidity of
a location or patent of land ·containing this cla·ss
of deposits, an apex may be presumed. But it does
not follow that an extralateral right may be predicated upon the presumption. In most of the sulphide copper districts vertical planes have been
established by agreement or common understanding. If, technically speaking, an extralateral right
could be legally predicated in this class of deposits, the 'common l!aw' of the district would undoubtedly follow the precedent set by Leadville in
dealing with the blanket deposits of that region,
resulting practically in the denial of extralateral
rights.'' (Vol. II, § 583, pp. 1319-1321. Emphasi~s
supplied.)
The situation here involved has been brought to the
attention of the courts on seVieral occasions wherein the
question of the exercise of extralateral rights bas arisen.
The case of Duggan et al. v. Davey et al. (4 Dak.110;
26 N.W. Rep. 887) pr·esents a situation wherein the court
was called upon to determine whether or not an apex
existed within the exterior surface boundaries of the
def.endants' mining location. This case announces the
rule that while a blanket or horizontal vein has no extralateral rights, it should be located as a lode claim, and that
the owner of a claim that h!as no apex ·cannot exercise
extralateral rights conf·erred by the Federal statute. Mr.
Lindley comments on this case at length in his Treatise
(I. Lindley on Mines, § 310, p. 689.) He states:
"It is one of the few cases which affords a full
opportunity of explaining by simple methods the
68
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true definition of the term 'top,' or 'ap·ex,' as well
as the 'strike' and' dip,' and their relationship one
to the other.''
The case of Gilpin v. Sierra Nevada Consolidated
Min. Co. (2 Idaho 696; 23 Pac. 547) clearly den1onstrates
that the law of extralateral rights has no application with
respect to a blanket or horizontal vein. The court said:
But the plaintiff also urges that,
\v·herever the apex of this vein may be, or if it
have no apex at all, but is simply a blanket vein,
if its apex be not between the defendant's side
lines, the defendant has no right to follow .it into
the plaintiff's grounds, ·Or within the boundaries
of the claims of which the plaintiff is in possession. That is a proper construction of the law. The
defendant's right to that ore, if he have such
right, must be based solely· upon the fact that the
vein has its apex within its own 'side lines.''
This case again announces the ·doctrine that · the
absence of an apex in a claim ·destroys extralateral rights.
Mr. Lindley, in reviewing this case in I. Lindley on Mines,
§ 310, p. 696, writes:
'' * •

•

'' * * * The supreme court of Idaho reversed
the order [of the lower court denying an injunction] and directed an injunction principally on the·
ground that the location of the Sierra Nevada did
not cover the ap~ex, and that the showing made did
not justify or authorize its presence underneath
the plaintiff's surface.''
Ban Francisco Chemical Co. v. Duffield (201 Fed.
830) (8th Cir.) also holds that a blanket vein is subject
to location as a lode claim although it has no apex. The
case definitely recognizes the existence of blanket veins.
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In Duffield_ ·et aJ, v. San Francisco Chemical Co. (205

Fed.. 480) the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that a zone of calcium phosphate is a lode
within the rnining laws and not a placer claim. It wrote:
'' • • • And a vein or lode is in place within
the meaning of the -statute when it is inclosed in
a general mass of what is known as country
rock, that general bed of the country which
remains in its original state unaffected by th•
action of the elements." (p. 484)

This decision reverses that of the trial court in 198
Fed. 942.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in its

decision in the cas~e of Iron Silver Mining Company v.
Mike and Starr ·Gold and Silver Mining Company (143
U.S. 394; 36 Law Ed. 201; 12 S. Ct. 543) is an important
authority in this inquiry. The follo'Ying excerpt is
pertinent:

'' * • * The fact is, there was an earnest inquiry * * * whether, in view of the disclosures
made in this, as in prior eases, of the existence of
a body of mineral underlying a large area of
·country in the Leadville mining district, whose
general horizontal direction, together with the
sedimentary character of the superior rock, indicated something more of the n1ature of a de..
posit like a coal bed than of the vertical and
descending fissure vein, in which silver and gold
are ordinarily found, it did not become necessary
to hold that the only pr·ovisions of the ,statute
under which title to any portion of this body of
mineral, 9r the ground in which it is situ!ated, can
.be acquired, are those with respect to placer
70
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claims. Of course, such conclusions W·ould have
compelled a revising of some former opinions,
and have wrought great changes in the status of
mining claims in th·a.t district. Because ·of this we
have been very careful, and the investigations
in these directions have been earnest and protracted. * • * It is enough to announce the results. * * * that the title to portions of this
horizontal vein or deposit, 'blanket' vein 1a.s it is
generally called, may be acquired under the sections concerning veins, lodes, etc. The fact that
so many patents have been obtained under these ·
sections, and th~a~t so many applications for patents are still pending, is a strong reason against
a new and contrary ruling.'' (pp. 399~400)
The following quotation is taken fr.om the opinion
of the Idaho supreme court in Stewart Mining Co. v.
Ontario Mining Co. et al. (23 Idaho 724; 132 Pac. 787):
'' Ap·pellant lays great stress on the words
'downward course', as employed in the statute
(section 2322), and counsel. have ~devoted many
pages of their brief to a discussion of the authorities which treat of this subject. In this statute the words 'downward course' and 'course
downwar·d' are used interch~ngeably, and it
was undoubtedly intended by the use of the
words to signify the course of the vein
from the surface toward the center of the
earth. Som·etimes it may happen that the 'downward course' of a vein will be perpendicular
!and the vein will form a vertical plane, but, as
a rule, there is a deflection in the downward
course of these mineral veins from the perpendicular, and we ·call this their dip; but still the
course of the dip is always 'downward,' and,
when the plane of the vein reaches the hori-
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zontal, then we have a blanket vein or lode, ~and
on such a vein a locator has no extralateral
right. Costigan, Mining Laws, 414, and authorities there cited. See 1 Lindley, §§ 300, 311.''
(p. 792)

.

In Morrison's ·Mining Rights, 15th Edition, at page
206, the author comments on Duggan v. Davey (supra),
Stewart Co. v. Ontario Go. (supra) and Gilpin v. Sierra
Nevada {Supra):
"In the case of Duggan v. D{]),vey, 4 Dak.
110, 26 N. W. 901, 17 M. R. 59, the top of the
lode was exposed by erosion and the erosion
extended downward where the side or edge of
the v-ein was exposed a:s it extended into the
earth ~on its dip of about 8 degrees. The Sitting
Bull Survey was laid upon this lateral outcrop
and sought to ·enjoin the claim below· it. The
Court found as !a matter of fact that the outcrop of the vein on which the Sitting Bull was
patented was the exposure of its lateral edge
and not of its top or true apex and that it was
therefore not entitled to extralateral rights.
((Stewart ·Go. v. Ontario Co., 23 Ida. 724,
132 P. 787, is a very similar case. It also decides
in terms the point stated in the next paragraph
-that a blanket vein has no extralater!al rights.
"The case of Gil!prin v. Sie,rra Nevada Co., 2
Ida. 696, 23 P. 547, 17 M. R. 310, intimates that
blanket veins can not claim to h!a,ve an apex
under the Mining Acts. The inclines on the
deposit in that instance as worked ran from
the surface up, instead of down.
''In the Leadville and Aspen ca.ses arising
upon veins of the ·character last !above described,
in the United States Circuit Court at Denver,
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any such distinetion as above 111ade has not been
recognized. But the strict ruling on other points,
that there· should have been no prior location
on the dip; that the apex location must be made
on 'a vein in place, and the necessity of having the
apex parallel to the side, and not parallel to the
end lines, which is a practical impossibility when
the real deposit is a deeply imbedded field, bed
or basin, with a more or less circular rim, have
circumscribed and practically defeated most attempts to follow such veins on their dip.
~~The

strength· of our contention is increased
by an attempt to apply the apex law to such
deposits as the lead and zinc beds. at Joplin,
niissouri. There the country for miles is underlaid by a stratum carrying zinc and le'ad ore.
The miner ·starts =a shaft in the open prairie,
without any indications whatever of mineral, and
at ·a certain depth confidently expects to pierce
this ore-bearing stratum, which is substantially
a flat underlying dep·osit, the outcrop ·of which
may be miles distant-if it have .any ·outcrop at
all it is only when s-ome bluff or ravine would
expose the edge of the bed at the surface. As to
such deposits it is obvious that there is no such
thing ·as locating a claim so many feet on e!ach
side of the center of the vein, for, a:s the Department holds: 'The apex of the lode is ·co-extensive
with the side lines. '-29 L. D. 689. In I ron 8.
·Co. v. M. & 8. Co., 143 U. S. 394, 36 L. Ed. 201, 12
Sup. Ct. Rep. 543, 17 M. R. 436, the opinion refers
to this distinction and reeognizes the validity
of such blanket lode locations, treating this incident of no apex proper as an item of minor importance. Blanket veins mu·st be located as lode
claims and not as placers.-Iron 8. Co. v. Camp-.
bell, 17 Colo. 274, 29 P. 513. '' (pp. 206, 207)
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The early case of McCormick v. Varnes, found in
40 Pac. S. Rep. 355, although decided under the Act of
Congress of July 26, 1866, contains the following comment which is relevant under the 1872 statute:
"Under the rules of the common law, he would
only be ·entitled to wbatever might be ov.er and
under the surface of a segment of the earth,
carved out by the exterior lines of the location
extended downwards indefinitely. Sections two
and four, of the act referred to, furnish the ()nly
qualification or enlargement of the common law
right by which miners hold their claims, and
that is to this extent only, that they may follow
the lode from the apex found within the ·surface
ground, on its dip to any depth, although in its
·course downward it may so far depart from
a perpendicular as to enter the land adjoini~g.
This must necessarily be beyond the side lines of
the location, because under ·all laws the end lines
form a bulwark beyond which the miner may not
· go. But he cannot go beyond or outside of his
side lines on the course or strike of the vein, it
is only on its dip· that this may be done.'' (pp.
362-363)
Reference is made to Whildin v. M.aryland Gold
Quartz Mining Go., (33 Cal. Ap~p. 270; 164 Pac. 908)
wherein this language is used:
''There :a:ve certain expressions, also, in some
of the decisions of the courts that lend ·color to
the contention that title to the lode independent
of the :surface boundari~es may ·be oa·cquired, but
they are not to be t1aken as laying down the law
in the premis·es. ''

74

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

This decision holds that a pa.tent covering a portion of
the lode lying beyond the exterior boundaries of the
claim is invalid.

1lfontana Ore-Purchasing Co. v. Boston & M. Consol. Copper d; Silver 1llin. Co., (20 Mont. 336; 51 Pac.
159) declares :

"* • * "While it is true that the surface of
mining ground is often spoken of in the decisions
of the courts as an incident to the vein whose
apex lies within or under it, we are clearly of the
opinion that the mining statutes of the United
States contain no authority for the conveyance
of the lodes or veins embraced in a located quartz
claim independently of the ·surface ground connected with and containing or overlying them.
~ • * The patent conveys an area ·of 2.98 ·acres
and no more. * * * In so far as the patent attempts
to convey the Blarus lode on its strike, independently of the granted surface of 2.98 acres, it is
void and of no effect.'' (pp. 160, 161)
Of particular importance to the present defendants'
claim that the patent to Jones of Tract A carried with
it no titie to the remaining part of the ''conflicting area,''
or the mineral ~eposit therein, the following extensive
quotation from State v. District Court (25 Mont. 504,
572; 65 Pac. 1020) is pertinent:
-

"* * * Suppos·e, for instance, there had been
no vacant surface within the boundaries of the
Copper Trust location, would it be contended
for a moment that 0 'Connor has any rights whatever under it? A discovery of ~a vein upon unoccupied land is ·absolutely essential to the validity
of a location. There must be a ·surface right.
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Without this no right to the lode can be established. The statutes do not authorize the land
·department to ·convey a lode independently of
the surface ground connected with and containing or overlying it. This is the conclusion stated
by this court in Montana Ore-Purchasing Co. v.
Boston & M. C:onsol. Copper & Silver Min. Co.,
20 Mont. 337, 51 P:ac. 159, in a case in which the
plaintiff claimed under a patent which attempted
to ·convey a small portion of surface covered by
the Barns location, together with 1,318 linear
feet of the lode, which had its apex in, and underlay the surface of, the Johnston, a conflicting
claim. The patent was held to be unauthorized
and void as to the portion .of the ledge not underlying the ~surface conveyed by it. This court
said: 'It is no doubt true that those :statutes,
taken ~as a whole, give greater prominence verb·ally to the lode ·or vein than to the surface connected therewith; but this naturally results from
the fact that the lode is the main subject treated.
Such expressions and such prominence, however, cannot avail to permit the grant of lodes
or veins embraced in 1a located quartz claim,
regardless of the 'surface connected therewith.'
T·he same view is stated by Mr. Lindley in his
work on Mines, in :section 780. It is only by virtue
of an ap,ex found within the surface of any claim
h·aving p~arallel end lines than .an owner may
!assert the right to enter beneath the surface ~of
his n'eighbor. This is the evident meaning of
section 2322 of the United States Statutes. Neither
this section nor any other provision of the statute
authorizes or provides a way for the appropriation of any portion ·of .a lode without .some portion
of the :surface thr·ough which it may be reached.
Should a p:atent issue to 0 'Connor, under the Del
Monte !and Hidee Cases it would issue for the
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whole surface within the Copper Trust boundaries, excluding all those portions covered by the
relators' patents. Under the principle of the
case of Montana Ore-Pu·rcha.sing Oo. v. Boston
& ~- C·onsol. Copper & Silver Min. Co., supra,
and as stated by Mr. Lindley, this would ipso
facto exclude the ore bodies lying within the disputed triangle. Again, the title to 1a mining
claim carries with it all the rights incident to a
title in fee at the common law, except in so far
as it is enlarged or limited by the ·statute. This
court, in Copper Co. v. H·einze, 25 Mont.-, 64
Pac., at page 329, in .considering such rights,
said: 'The patent grants the fee, n·ot to the surface and ledge only, but to th·e land containing
the apex {)f the ledge. The right to follow the
ledge upon its dip between the vertical planes of
the parallel end lines extending in their own direction, when it departs beyond the vertical planes
of the side lines, is an expansion of the rights
which would be conferred by a ·common-law g:r.ant.
On the other hand, this grant is :subject to the
right of an adjoining locator to follow his vein
upon its course downward beneath the surface
included in the grant. In these two resp·ects only
do the rights conferred by the .statute differ from
those held under a ·common-law grant.' Therefore, viewed merely -as land with the ordinary
incidents of ownership, the OWiller holds everything beneath the surface, subject only to the right
-of an adjoining loeator or patentee, who _has the
apex of a vein, and who has eomp·lied with the
statute, to pursue it on its dip beneath the surface.
0 'Connor has no part of the apex of the vein so
·situated with reference to the ore bodies within
the triangle that he may pursue the vein from
the .surface. He cannot a.cqurire any portion of
the surface belonging to the relators. N·eith~r
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~can

he pass through the St. Lawrence from the
point at which he made his ·discovery, or from any
point within 1any of the surface owned by him.
He is therefore not in a positi~on, by virtue of
his location, to maintain his ·claim to the ores in
·controversy. Under the principle of Copper Co.
v. Heinze, :supra, and upon the undisputed facts
presented upon this application, they belong
prima facie to the relators, .as owners of the Rob
Roy claim, and others to the ~south by virtue of
their common-law rights.'' (pp. 1025, 1026)

The Supreme Court of Nevada, in Golden Fleece Co.
v. Cable Con. Co. (12 Nev. 329) wrote thus:
"Under that law (of 1872) it ~annot be doubted
that it (plaintiff) is bound by the lines of its
surface claim in favor of the subsequent locator.
It is true that the vein is the principal thing
and the surface but an incident thereto; but it
is also true that the mining law has ·provided
~no means ·of locating a vein except by defining
a surface claim including the croppings or point
at which the vein was exposed, and the part of
the vein located is determined by reference to
the lines of the surface claim. These lines ·are
fixed by the m·onuments in the ground, and they
cannot be changed so as to interfere with other
'Claims subsequently located.''

Gleeson v. llfartin White Min. Go. (13 Nev. 456)
contains this comment:
''Sound policy, therefore, concurs with the
language :of the st·atute in sustaining our conclusion that a vein can only be located by means
of a surface claim. ''
78
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In Harper v. Hill (159 C·al. 250; 113 Pac. 162) the
Supren1e Court of Calif.ornia cited the Golden Fleece
and Gleeson cases and then commented as follows:

''These observations were made with reference to the rights of subsequent locators of
adjoining ground against ~changes in the lines
attempted by the first locators. But the point of
the decision is that the rights of the parties are
fixed by the lines marked ·on the ground when
the location is made.'' (p. 166)
Appellants particularly emphasize their contenti10n
that part of Finding 19, to wit, "the discovery within
Tract A lies upon the apex of said lode or vein,'' is not
only not -supported ·by substantial evi~dence, but is a
finding in complete contradiction to plaintiffs' own
evidence. The plaintiffs' witnes'Ses, Hanson an·d _Christens·en, repeatedly testified that this ore deposit has no
apex, strike or dip, but that it is a deposit within a truncated trough. In the face of this evide'nce coming from
the plaintiffs, it is difficult to discover the reas:on the
trial court made this finding. In this :connection, attention is invited to Finding 11:
'' S·aid ore body was, prior to its being mined
·by the plaintiffs a body -of ir'on-be-aring rock in
place ·embedded in a trough-like impression with
its walls converging as they descend.''
By this finding the court ~ollowed the evidence of Hanson and Christensen; but in making that p.art of the
finding contained in Finding 19, to which the defendants
object, the court departed from the evidence of these
witnesse'S and, in fact, denied it. The evidence without

79
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

contradiction therefore proved that the deposit is a
blanket or horizontal deposit which h.as no apex.
Conclusions of Law 1 and 2, to which objection is
made by app·ellants, are the product ·Of the erroneous
part of Finding 19 and deny -authoritative mining deci'Sions. The authorities herein cite·d announce the rule
that .a lode claim without an apex cannot e~e~cise extnalateral rights. Since this is ·a blanket or horwontal
deposit, Mr. Lindley teaches us that no extralateral
rights -attach. Again to qu·ote him:
''To apply the extralateral right doctrine of
bisected apex and 'broad lodes' to this character
of deposits would be an absurdity." (supra)
Appellants respe·ctfully submit that this error is of
such substantial nature :as to require a nullification ·of
the judgment in this action.

2. .The patent to Tract A granted to Jones
title only to that part of the mineral deposit within
the exterior boundary lines of Tract A and not to
any part of the deposit in the ''conflict area" upon
which appellants' claims are located.
If the extralateral · right .doctrin·e he dis·carded, as
appellants believe it ;should be, then plaintiffs !are forced
to the po.sitiori of as.serting that the conveyance of that
part of the blanket or horizontal deposit specifieally
des·cribed in the patent as Tr.act A gives title to the
whole deposit in the ''~conflict area.'' Such position is
wholly untenable un,der R.S. 2322 (U.S.C.A., Title 30, §
26) which declares that a patentee "shall have the ex-
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elusive right of p~ossession and enj-oyment of all the
surface included within the lines of their location ~and
of all veins, lodes or ledges thfloughou t their en tire
depth, the top ·or apex {)f which lies inside of such :surface lines extended downward ve·rtically • • * ''
It is n1a.nifest that under this 'statute and the
authorities hereinbefore cited, the right of a lode patentee
to mineral deposits exterior to the lines of the patented
area is dependent solely upon the existence of an apex
being inside of the surface lines of the patented area.
Therefore, Jones' title to that p·art ·Of the mineral
deposit exterior to the lines of Tract A is solely dependent upon the existence of an apex within Tract A. Jones'
patent to Tract A conferred upon him and his grantees
no title to the mineral deposit exterior to the limits
thereof, except ·as might arise through the operation of
the extralateral rights doctrine. The ·authoritie's heretofore cited clearly sustain this proposition. It would
therefore appear that ·On this faeet of the case plaintiffs'
rights to that part of the mineral deposit contained
within the area of defendants' locations must ~stand or
fall on the proposition that the apex of the deposit is
contained within Tract A and that the deposit dips to
the west. They .cannot ·claim that ~although there is no
apex in Tract A the patent to Tr·act A convey·ed title
to the reinaining part of the mineral deposit in the''conflict area. ' '

3. With respect to the exercise of extralateral
rights, the patent in favor of J,ones covering Tract
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A created no conclusive presumption as to the
existence of an apex within its boundaries.
There is a suggestion in the record of trial of this
action that the patent to J,ones of Tract A established
a ·Conclusive presumption thla~t the ap·ex of the mineral
de-posit exists therein ·and that in the present action
~defendants are ha.rred from collaterally attacking this
presumption. Appellants recogniz·e the e"Stablished rule
of law that la patent cannot be ·collaterally atta-cked on
account of any question which the Land Department
can lawfully determine before issuing the patent (Davis
v. Weibbold, 139 U.S. 507, 35 Law Ed. 238, 11 S. Ct.
628; Steel v. St. Louis Smelting and Ref. Co., 106 U.S.
447 ; 27 Law Ed. 226; 1 S. Ct. 389). This rule is :subject
to an important excep·tion. Mr. Lindley comments on
this ·exception ~as follows (Ill Lindley on Mines, § 780,
p. 1900):
''We have ·always been of the opinion, and we
think it supported by the weight of authority,
that in justifying his presence underneath
foreign territory the .apex claimant is not aided
.by ·any presumptions of fact flowing from the
patent with regard to the position of the :a.pex
:and its ·course through the ·claim; that the conclusive presumption as to the validity of the
patent is confined to the surface area and its
vertical bounding pJanes, that is, to its intralimital rights, which are subject to a right of
inv;asion only by an ·outside a.pex p;roprietora right reserved by l'aw and express·ed ·in the
patent. In other words, a lode patent does not
~aise ·any presumpt~on in justification of the
invasion of ·another's territory, as to the position
1

82
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the apex or the course 'Of the vein, but th·ese
facts, when challenged by the proprietor of the
invaded claim, should be proved by the apex
claimant, regardless of presumptions. flowing
from the patent. The circuit court of app~e~als. of
the eighth circuit, in the caJse of Work Mining
and Milling Company v. Doctor Jack P.ot Mining
Co., [194 Fed. 620; 114 C.C.A. 392] challenges
this vie,Y, and is sponsor for a doctrine which
gives presmnptive effect to the p~atent as to the
existence of these basic facts. * * * ''
Mr. Lindley then ·p·roceeds to ·analyze .and discuss the
Doctor Jack P~ot casie 'and con·clude'S that it was indigenous to the state law ~of Colorado requiring the 'sinking
of a discovery shaft which must disclose the 1crevice or
vern. He then writes:

"* * * There:f5ore, patent having been is'sued,
~such

vein must be conclusively presumed to :exist
in the 'shaft. If this he the ·correct rule, it follows
that the force of ~a federal patent issued for a
lode claim in a state having a discovery ishaft law
is much more potential than the .sam'e kind of ~a
patent would be in a state having no such law,
e. g., California ·and Utah. In other words, the
Oali£ornia and Utah apex ·Claimant must prove
the ·situ'S and cou:vS'e of his :apex when his rights
are challenged by an outside proprietor whose
territory is invaded, while in c.o1or·ado ·and other
·states similarly situated the burden tshifts to the
latter to show that the .ap·ex of the vein cros,se's
the ·side lines, and this is the only def'ense a~ail
able to him.
''Another 'sugge!stion we think quite pertinent
finds expression in the decision of the supreme
court of Utah, in the case of Grand Central
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Mining Company v. M~ammoth Mining Company.
* "" *" (29 Utah 490, 83 Pac. 648, 677. Ibid. §
780, p. 1905)
At this point Mr. Lindley quotes the ex~cerpt from
the Gr.and Central ca;se heretofore ·set forth in this brief,
and then concludes with this ·statement:
''For administrative purposes the land department ·necess-arily ~as~sume's that the course of the
vein is lengthwise of the claim, but this ·does not
signify that when the patent once issues there is
'a presumption that :such is the f,act. If the doetrine of the circuit court tOf appeals in the case
under ·consideration should be applied to the flat
deposits found in ·Leadville, or in the Black Hills
·of South D~akota, or to the copper 1sulphide zones
of N ev:ada and Arizona, or in the phosphate
regions of Idaho ~and Wyoming, all of which
must be patented under the lode laws, as the
deposits are essentially in place, the production
of a patent presuming an apex extending lengthwiS'e of the claim would take the entire sweep
of the deposit, 'Since it would be impossible for
the defendant to p]}ove that the vein crosts~ed the
side-lines of plaintiff's claim.

* * * * *
"It seems to the author that the rational
solution of the difficulty is not to consider the
rule, which requires the ap,ex claimant to justify
hi1s presence in :Doreign territory by 1Showing the
position ~and ,eourse of hi'S ~apex, as an attack on
the p:atent, but r~ather an inquiry as to what was
gr.anted by the p~atent outside of its vertical
boun~daries.

''In support of the validity of the patent
as it affe.cts !and conveys intralimital rights,
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such patent may be given conclusive effect. But
when atten1pts are m:ade to assert rights which
are extrala teral, the exercise of which must be
predicated on the existence of physical f~acts,
rather than presun1ptions, it would see1n the
party asserting the extralateral rights should
be compelled to prove the racts.
*
* * *
''With the highest res·pect f~or the opinion of
the eighth circuit court of appeals, we feel that
its ·opinion in the "Vork-Doctor Jack Pot case
asserts a ·doctrine that will not receive the s·anction .of the supreme court of the United States.''
(Ibid. § 780, pp. 1907-9)
.
:j(t

Mr. MorriS'on, in his ''Mining Rights,'' 15th Edition,
comments on the Doctor Jack Pot case as follows:
"That there was no vein in fact in the discovery cut, it would seem to ns· ought to be provable when such assumed vein i's being use·d ~as a
basis for claiming ·and fixing extr.alateral rights.
If it may be shown that the ~discovery vein leaves
its· ~side line, it seems a fortiori that 1a p·arty would
be rallowed to ShOW that there w.as no vein there
to follow to either end or 'side line. This would
not- in the least .overthrow the· rule that the discovery cannot be impeached for the purpose of
defeating the patent as a muniment of title. But
the decision being affirmed in the Circuit Co11rt
of Appeals, 194 F. '620, 114 C. C. A. 392, settles
the point !adversely to our contention until pa1ssed
on by the Supreme Court and so we yield .to
authority, our reason abiding unconvinced. '' (p.
216)
The case of Golden v. Murphy (31 Nev. 395; 103 Pac.
394, 406) contains the following pertinent comment:
1
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'' • • • What may .constitute a sufficient discovery to war~ant ~a location of ~a claim may be
wholly inadeqUJate to justify the 1oca.tor in claiming or exercising any rights re1served by the statutes. What constitutes a discovery that will
Vialidate a location i!s 'a very different thing
from what .constitutes a;n 'apex, to which attaches
the 'Statutory right to invade th:e posse~ssion of
and ·appropriate the property which is presumed
to belong to an 'adjoining owner. The question of
a sufficient discovery ~of ,a vein, or of the validity
of a notice of location, upon which the cases cited
by the ;appellant on this point ·are .authority, is
'Substantially different from one relating to the
continuity of a vein on its dip from the apex, and
which tests the rights of the undisputed owner
of the jsurfa·ce to what lies underneath and within
his own boundaries. It is the object and policy
of the law to encourage the prospector and miner
in their efforts to dis·cover the hidden tre~asures
of the mountains, and there£ore, ·as between conflicting lode claimants, the law is liberally construed in fa~or of the senior location; but, where
one claims· what prima facie belongs to hi·s
neighbor, because of an apex in the claimant's
location, a more rigid rule of construction against
the claim,ant prevails, and, tas we have already
observed, 'he has the bu:vden to :show, not merely
th·at the vein on its dip may include the ore hodies
in the adjoining ground, but that in faet it does
-'so include them. Until he establishes such fact
beyond rea1sonable ·Controversy he has no rights
outside his side lines in lanother''S ground. 'In
determining what .constitutes su·ch a discovery
a;s will satisfy the law .and form the basis of a
v,alid mining location, we find, as in the case of
the definition of the terms "lode" or "vein"
that the tendency of the ·courts is toward marked
86
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liberality of construction where a question :aris~s
between two miners who have located claims
upon the same lode, or within the same surface
boundaries, ·and tow~ard ·strict rules of interpretation when the miner asserts rights in property
which either prima f.acie belongs to .s·ome one
else, or is claimed under laws other thlan those
providing f.or the disposition of mineral lands,
in which latter case the relative value :of the tract
is a matter directly in i·ssue. The reason for this
is ·obvious. In the case where two miners· assert
rights based upon separate alleged dis~coverie's
on the s~ame vein neither is hamp·ered ·with presumptions arising from ~a pri!or grant of the
tract, .to overcome which strict proof is required.
In applying a liberal role to one cl·ass of cases
and a rigid rule to another the courts justify their
action upon the theory that the object of each ·
section :of the Revised Statutes, and the whole
policy of the entire law, should not be overlooked.'
1 Lindley ·on Mines (2d Ed.) § 336. The Supreme
Court of Montana, in Fitzger,ald v. Clark, 17
Mont. 100, 42 Pac. 273, 30 L. R. A. 803, 52 Am.
St. Rep. 665, observed: 'When it i s ~s.aid that
a location may be BU'stained by the discovery of
mineral deposits of such Vlalue as to 'at least
justify- the explor.ation of the lode in the expecta- tion of finding ore sufficiently valuiable to work,
it is a very different question f:vom telling a jury
that the geological fact of the continuity of the
vein to a ·certain point may be determined by what
a practical miner might do in looking for ~some
hoped-for continuity.' Migeon v. M ont. Cent.
Ry. Co., 77 Fed. 249, 23 C. C. A. 156; Bonner v.
Meikle (C. C.) 82 Fed. 697; United States v.
Iron Silver Min. Co., 128 U. S. 673, 9 Sup·. Ct.
195, 32 L. Ed. 571. ''
1

1
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The case of Grand Central Min. ·Co. v. Mammoth
Min. Co. (Utah), frequently cite·d he-rein, declares:
"We concede, ~as c1aime·d by the appellant,
that a p.atent to .a mining ·claim raises a conclusive presumption :that there is the apex of 'a
vein within the patented ground (1 Lindley ·on
Mines~ § 305) ; but .there is no presumption that
it is -the apex of the vein in ·dispute, and such
presumption 'applies equally to the Silveropolis
and Consort mining claims 'as to lot 38, and
does not shift the burden of proof in this ·case
as to the ·apex land .continuity of the vein and ore
in contl"oversy. '' (83 P:ae. 668)
Plaintiffs !affirmatively disproved the existence of
an apex in Tract A or in any part of the deposit. In the
face of this p:rtoof, it hardly is consistent for them to rely
upon the theory the patent to T:vact A ~aise'S ~a conclusive
pre'sumption as to the existence of 1an apex therein. If
they desired to rely upon any such pre~sumption (which
in ·appellants' opinion reliable authorities deny), then
the intr·oduetion in evidence of the Jones' patent would
have made their case. They proceeded, however, by
their ~own evi•dence, to prove the non-existence ·of an
apex or dip in T:vact A or in iany part 10f the deposit.
Stated ·otherwise, by their own action they totally demolished the p·resumption, if .any existed. Unle'ss they are
prepared to dis:avow their own evidence, it is· difficult
to see how they ·can t'Orture !any presumption .as to the
existence of an 'apex on Tract A from the issuance of
the patent ,covering s·ame.
Aside, however, from plaintiff's' proof th,at no apex,
strike or dip exists :on Tract A or 1any p·art of the deposit,
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defendants assert that the issuance of the Jones p!a,tent
created n<> presumption--eonclu'Sive or otherwi~se-that
an apex exists in Tract A ·as found by the c·ourt. This
was a fact to be proved at trial 'and pl~aintiffs themselves
successfully disproved it.

VI
THE PATENT ISSUED TO WALKER AND
BLAIR COVERING THE ARMSTRONG PLACER
CLAIM AND THE ARMSTRONG "IRON MINE"
INCLUDED NO PART OF THE MINERAL DEPOSIT, EXCLUDING PLACER RIGHTS, SITUATE IN THE "CONFLICT AREA."
By reference to the Armstrong p!atent (Sipulation;
R. 22-25) it is manifest that the ·description of the Armstrong ''iron mine'' does not extend the same into the
''conflict ·area.'' Taking the paten~ on its £ace, the south
line of the ''iron mine'' was located 'approximately 135
feet north of the ·south line of the Armstrong placer
claim. Hereinbefore it has been explained that Mr.
Dickert, the deputy miner:al surveyor, did n·o~ extend the
lode location to the south line of the pla·cer claim because
he was mistaken as to the location of this ·S'outh line.
Instead of being coincident with this· s·outh line, the
s·outh line of the lode claim w~s about 135 feet north of
it. The descrip·tion of the ''iron mine'' gives its
acreage as 1.36 of an acre more or less, and then
proceeds with the declaration ''that .three hundred
ninety-six (396) linear feet of the 'Armstrong' iron
1nine designated by the Surveyor General as lot number
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forty-one (41) ·and 'according to 'the return on file in
the general land office bounded, ·de·scribed land platted
as follows with Magnetic Variation a.t fifteen degrees
(15°), thirty-two minutes (32') east.'' There then follows
a description of the iron mine by metes an'd bounds, ·and
this de scription makes the northeasterly-southwesterly
direction 396 feet, and the easterly-westerly direction
210 feet. The ·de·scription therefore definitely limits the
gT~ant. Beyond dispute, such grant did not describe •any
part ·of the mineral deposit within the ''conflict area.''
1

1. The law of ·extralateral rights cannot be
applied to follow a vein along its strike.
If it be assumed that the Armstrong mine has a strike
along its· southwe!sterly-northeaJsterly ·axis, such .assumption will yield nothing to the plaintiffs. They ;cannot asse·rt extralateT~al rights along the 'strike of ·a vein or lode.
The early Utah case of McCormick v. Varnes, hereinbefore ·cited, fixes the law on that point. Other authorities
hereinbefore quoted likewise sustain this aoctrine,
among which Montana Ore-Purchasing Co. v. Boston &
M. Cons. Copper and Silver Mining Co., supra, elaborates this rule. It is not believed that there will be any
serious denial of the rule here asserted that the plaintiffsi cannot claim ownership of that part of the deposit
in the '' ·confli;ct area'' by virtue of the extralateral
right doctrine.

2. The grant of the Armstrong "iron mine"
in the Walker-Blair patent specifically fixed its
limits and there can be no implication that there
90
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'vas patented that part of the deposit within the
"conflict area."
...\.ppellant~ adurit that \Yith referenee to the judgIuents in Equity Cases 522 ·and 1053 in the Circuit Court
of the United States for the District of Utah (Exhibits
'· S ", "T" and "U "), hereinbef·ore mentioned, that as
to these appellants the doctrine of res ·adjudicata is not
available inasmuch as they are third party claimants !and
"\vere not parties or privies to these actions. ·On the other
hand, the decision of Judge l\Iarshall in the first mentioned equity action is certainly authority which may be
quoted by appellants to sustain the ·contention herein
made. Appellants have obtained from the files of this
case in the office of the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Utah, a copy of Judge
Marshall's opinion in the case. Judge Marshall wrote
as follows:
'' 1}he surface lines adopted by him [the
locator] limit his right to .the vein to the same
extent if he had only a lode location. He ha'S the
opportunity to develop the course of his lode, ·and
must suffer the consequence of a failure to do so.
To the extent the vein is not covered his ·application for p·atent is a conclusive declaration that he
'has no right to it. When the s~tatute was en,acted
the generally accepted facts of vein occurrence
were of .course known to Congress. It must have
been ~assumed that in ground which .could be
properly located as placer, surnace indications· of
veins would be infrequent 1and of limited extent;
that where ·a vein was known to exist in a placer
the knowledge would extend to but ·a 'Small part
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of the vein if the p·1acer ·claimant was· to reap
an advantage by failing to explore it. The higher
price for the lode WJa.s intended to dis,courage .a
monopoly of the more valuable deposit (Reynolds v. Iron Sil. M. Co., 116 U.S. '687, 695)."
T,he opinion in Montana Ore-Purchasing ·Co. v. Boston & M. Cons. Copper and Silver Min. Co. holds that
the grant of a lode location within a placer claim is
confined to a ·description of the lode in the patent and
that the gr1ant was void in its attempt to include ano;ther
part of the lode outside of the ·spe·cific area des•cribed.
Let Mr. Lindley summarize the matter.

''A lode patent conveys:'' ( 1) The exclusive right of possession and
enjoyment ·of all the surface included within ,the
limits ·of the location, as described in the patent,
subject only to pre-existing easements;
'' ( 2) All veins, lodes, and ledges throughout
;their entire depth, .the ·top·s, or apices, ·of which
lie within the boundaries, the right to pursue
the vein in depth outside of such boundaries
·being limited, however, to ·cases where the lines
of the location and the physical conditions with
respe·ct to ·the lode are such as are outlined in
the chapter on extra1ateral rights;
"(3) Prima facie, such a patent confers the
right to everything f.ound within vertical planes
·d:rrawn through the surface ,boundaries; but the·se
boundaries may be invaded by an outside lode
locator holding the ·ap~ex of 'a vein under a ·regular valid location, in ·the pursuit of his vein ·on
its~ downward ·cour:se underneath the patented
-surface. How the prima facie presumption may
be overcome, .and on whom rests the bur.den of
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proof, will be diseus·sed when dealing with the
action of trespass and the rule·s of evidence
applicable to such action.

• • • • •
· · _..-\_~ under the existing law, the appropriation of the vein is ·accomplished by locating a
surface including it, the locator can obtain no
more in length than is included within the limits
of the surface boundaries, and the mere call in
the survey and patent for so many feet of the
lode is of no moment. If. a patentee is granted
fifteen hundred linear feet on a vein, he will
obtain that much, if so much is found within his
surface boundaries. If there is less, if the vein
does not traverse the full length of his cl·aim,
but passes out of -a side-line, ·the patentee may
not follow it outside of these boundaries on the
strike. T·here is no reason for perpetuating the
early theories followed by the land department
as to lode patents under the act of 1866. There
is no necessity for inserting in the patent the
number of linear feet granted. The patent is
certainly not conclusive evidence of the physical
existence of a lode .to any continuous extent.
The issuance of a lode patent conclusively presumes the existence within its boundaries of ·an
apex, as this is .a f;act necessary to ;support its
validity, ·but it will not be p~resumed ~that this
apex takes any particular direction or extends
for ·any ·definite length. The course of the lode
as indicated by the hypothetical lode line exhibi.ted
by ·the surveyor concludes no one.
''The patent will only convey so much of the
lode as has its apex within the boundaries, and
the call for length in the patent is useless."
(III Lindley on Mines, 3d Ed., § 780, pp. 18971899)
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Attention is invited to rthe provisions of R.S. 2333
(U.S.C.A., Title 30, § 37) covering the issuance of a
patent to a lode claim contained wit}rin !a placer claim
which in part provides :

" * * * an application for a .patent for such
placer claim which does not include an applica~tion for the vein or lode ·claim ·s·hall be construed
as a conclusive ·declaration that the claimant of
the placer claim has no right of possession of
the vein or lode claim. • • • ''
Under ~this quoted provision of the s·tatute, it has been
definitely adjudicated that if a placer claimant does
not apply for a patent to 1a known lode claim at the
time he applies for a patent to ·the pl,acer cl·aim, that
he conclusively foreswears ~all right to the lode claim.
(Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Mike and Starr Gold and
Silver Mining ·Co., sup·ra; Reynolds v. Iron 8. M. Co.,
116 U.S. 687, 29 Law Ed. 774, '6 S. Ct. 601 ; II Lindley
on Mines, 3d Ed., § 413, p. 963)
The :a:ction of Armstrong in applying for a patent
to the ''iron mine'' within the placer claim conclusively
-shows th~at he had knowle·dge ·Of the existence of the
lode ·claim at the time he applied for the placer patent.
By his application and the patent which w·as issued
thereon, the measurements of the lode ·claim were definitely fixed. He there£,ore ·conclusively declared that
he bJa.d no right in the miner,al deposit exterior to the
lines of his lode loeation and cl~aim. If a f.ailure of a
placer claimant to in·clude in his placer application an
application for a known lode in toto ~cuts off his right
94
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to clain1 the lode, it seen1s logically to follow thJat his
specific delineation of the part of the lode claimed by
him excludes any p·art of the. mineral deposit not included in his lode claim although the same may be situ·ate
within his placer location. Judge Marshall, in his opinion to which reference is above made, ·confirms this
principle in the following 1angu:age:
''To the extent the vein is not covered. in
'IDS application for patent is a conclusive declaration that he has no right to it.'' (See quoted
excerpt supra.)

SPECIAL NOTE
Finding No. 18 is to the effect that the pl~aintiff
Excelsior Iron Mining Company is the owner of the
en tire ''conflict area'' including the entire •sur~ace
thereof ·and all the ores and minerals lying upon or
within said :area. Conclusion of Law No. 4 declares
th!at on April 30, 1949 the area embr·aced within the
four Lucky locations was not open to location under
the mining laws of the United. States or the State of
Utah, by the defendants or anyone else. Such ~area
was not public domain but each and every part thereof,
together with all the mine~als lying upon or. therein,
WJas and is the property of plaintiff Excelsior Iron
Mining Company, subject only to the rights of its
lessee, the plaintiff Utah Construction Comp,any.
Appellants assert that in this brief they have demon~trated that these findings, and each of them, are not
supported by substantial evidence, but conversely, the
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evidence in this case proves that the locations of the
Lucky claims were made upon ~a par.t of the ''conflict
area'' which was public dom·ain and subject to location
a:s lode ·cl·aims. On this basis, and for this reason, the
appellants assign error in these findings, and each of
them, and further ·contend that a finding should have
been made that the part of the mineral deposit in the
''conflict area'' upon which aP'pellants' locations were
ntade w~as public domain and subject to location, and
that the plaintiffs were trespassers upon the same on
April 30, 1949.
Before the question of the validity of ·appellants'
locations can be reached, it is incumbent upon the court
to pass upon and determine the correctness of the position assumed by appellants with respect to the title
to the mineral deposit in the ''conflict area''. Unless
this is done, there can be no pro:per determination of
the VJalidity of appellants' locations. The f·acts as disclosed by the evidence in this case and the l·aw applicable to such facts bars the road to an 'adjudication of
the validity of appellants' locations unless and until it
is determine·d ·that the part of the minel'lal deposit in
the ''conflict area'' upon which appellants' locations
were made was or was not a part of the public domain
on April 30, 1949.
In the event of an adjudication that the ·part of
the mineiial deposit in !the ''·conflict are:a'' here involved
was public ·domain on .A:p·ril 30, 1949, then the ques.
tion as to the method •and means pursued by ~appellant
Justheim in making his locations will be subject to
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review. On the other hand, if it be determined that on
. -\pril
.
30, 1949 plaintiff Excelsior Iron Mining Comp·any
held valid legal title to the mineral deposit in the ''conflict ·area'', then the question ·as to ·the validity of a ppellants' locations will resolve itself adversely to appellants.

vn
THE ENTRANCE OF DEFENDANTS UPO·N
THE "CONFLICT AREA" FOR THE P·URPOSE
OF LOCATING THE LUCKY CLAIMS WAS NEITHER FRAUDULENT, CLANDESTINE NOR
SURREPTITIOUS, BUT WAS MADE IN BROAD
DAYLIGHT WHEN EMPLOYEES AND AGENTS
OF PLAINTIFFS WERE PRESENT. DEFENDANTS WERE NOT TRESPASSERS BUT ENTERED UPON UNAPPROPRIATED PUBLIC
LAND SUBJECT TO LO~CATION.
Thirty-four years prior to the making of ~defend
ants' locations, the defendant Gorlinski has warned
plaintiffs' pr.edecessor in ·title and its trustee of the
situation p-revailing with respect to the "conflict tarea'')
(Plaintiffs' Exhibits "Y" and "Z'' ~and Gorlinski's
testimony, R. 252, 261-266, 269-271) ; but nothing was
done by plaintiff and its p·redeces'Sor in title wi,th respect
to locating and patenting the s•ame. The area _was left
open to loeation. Gorlinski had long ~ceased to occupy a
fiduciary relationship towards plaintiff and its predecessor in title. The locations were made by Justheim,
not Gorlinski. Gorlinski was employed by Justheim as
an engineer (R. 261). The evidence shows that the
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defendants' entrance into the ''conflict area'' WJas peaceful ·and without breach ·of the pe-ace. It was not clandestine because it was made op·enly when agen,ts and
serv~ants of the plaintiff were present. Reference to the
testimony of plaintiffs' witness Rhodes (R. 202, 203,
205) shows thlat the pre·sence of J ustheim and Gorlinski on the date of defendants' locations w~as known by
the servants :and employees of the plaintiff Utah Construction Company. There was no concealment of their
'presence, nor did they take any action which w·as not
overt to any observer. The evidence shows that their
purpose Wlas not concealed. There w~as no misrepresentation as to the purpose or objectives of their presence
on the property. Gorlinski located defendants' claims
by use of a transit (R. 239).
''Every competent loCJator has the right to
initiate a lawful claim to unoccupied public land
by a peaceable ~adverse entry upon it while it
is in the possession of those who have no superior right to acquire title or to hold the possession." (Nelson v. Smith, 42 Nev. 302, 176 Pac.

261)
in~alid
because of the 1absence of a dis·0overy ,cut, ~at the

" * * * If defendant's location was

time plaintiff made peaceable entry, then the
territory within the boundaries of defendant's
claim was at the time op.en to location under the
mining I~aws, and plaintiff ·could lawfully initi,BJte his location within th~ boundaries of the
Iva C. ·cl,aim, irrespective of what his belief was
as to territory being unoccupied and una.ppropri·
a ted * * * and, if the Iva C. location was invalid
for such reason, it was immaterial to the v~alidity
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of plaintiff's location th~at plaintiff knew that
the claim of defendant had been surveyed for
patent, and the boundaries had been marked on
the ground, and that the situs of the claim w~as
known to him, and tha't the defendant had posted
his patent plats and notices. If. the location of
defendant was invalid f.or the reasons assigned,
plaintiff "~as not :a. trespasser when he ~attempted
to initiate his loca~tion therein. The jury ought
to have been plainly told that, if ·defendant's
claim was invalid for the reason assigned, the
plaintiff could initiate his location within the
boundaries of such claim." (Wwtsh v. Henry, 38
Colo. 393, 88 P·ac. 449, 450)
Appellants p~rticularly emphasize the case of
Thallmann v. Thomas (111 E-,ed. 277) from which the
following quotation is taken:
''A valid claim to unappropriated public land
cannot be instituted while it is in possession of
another who has the right to its possession under
an earlier lawful location. Risch v. Wiseman
(Or.), 59 Pac. 1111; Seymour v. Fisher, 16 Colo.
188, 27 P1ac. 240. Nor can such ·a ·claim be initiated by forcible or fraudulent entry upon land
in possession of one who has no right either to
the possession or to the title. Atherton v. Fowler,
96 U. S. 513, 516, 24 L. Ed. 732; Trenouth ·v. San
Francisco, 100 U.S. 251, 256, 25 L. E·d. 626. But
every c-ompetent locator has the right to initiate
a lawful claim to un·app-rop·riated public lan·d by
a peaceable adverse entry upon it while it is in
the :possession of those who have no superior
right to acquire the title or to hold the posse·ssion. Belk v. Meagher, 104 U.S. 279, 287, 26
L. Ed. 735; Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72, 20
L. E·d. 485; Nevada Sierra Oil Co. v. Home Oil Co.
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(C. C.), 98 Fed. 673, 680. Any other rule would
make the wrongful occupation of public land by a
trespasser superior in right to a lawful entry of it
under the ~acts of ~congress by 1a ~comp~etent locator. There was nothing in the possession of
the lode in· this land by the complainants many
feet below its surface, and their wrongful removal of ore from it, nor in· the defendant's suspicion or knowledge of this trespass, nor in the
fact, if i1t be ~a f~act, that he learned of the trespass through his employment as a miner and
·shift boss of the ~complainants, to prevent him
from making an honest and v:alid location of ~a
mining ~claim upon this unapprop~riated portion
of the public domain in occordance with the P'rovisions of the acts ·of congress whi~ch offered
him this p·rivilege." (p. 278, 279)
Cited in the Thallmann case is the important decision of Belk v. Meagher (104 U.S. 279, 26 L. Ed. 735).
The ·consideration of the Belk ·case is extremely relevant
to the present dis-cussion, inasmuch as it appears to be
the basi~c de~cision of the United States Supreme Court
with respect to !adverse mineral locations. Belk was
the plaintiff in an ejectment action against Meagher.
The court determined that Belk's relocation of the disputed claim was invalid on January 1, 1877, when the
original ·claims lapsed. His possession of the c1aim
arose from his location of it and occasional labor upon
it. O·n February 21, 1877, the defendants entered on
the :prop·erty ~and made another location, doing all thla.t
was required to perfe·ct their rights if the premises
were at the time open to them. The court propounded
this question for determination :
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~'Whether,

even if the relocation of Belk was
invalid, the defendants could, after the 1st of
J·anuary, 1877, make 1a relocation which would
give them as ·against him 'an exclusive right to
the possession and enjoyment of the property,
their entry for that purpose being made peaceably and without force." (104 U.S. 281)
The opinion then continued :

''This brings us to the inquiry whether the
possession of Belk, after the 1st of January,
was such as to prevent the defen·dants from
making a valid relocation and acquiring title
under it. * * *
''Under the provisions of the Revised Statutes relied on, Belk ·could not get a patent for the
claim he attempted to locate, unless he secured
what is here made the equivalent of a V!alid
location by actually holding and working f.or the
requisite time. If he ~actually held possession and
worked the claim long enough, and kept all others
out, his right to .a patent would be complete. He
hJad no grant of ·any right of possession. His
ultimate right to a p·atent ;depended entirely on
·his keeping himself in and all ·others out, 'and
if he was not ~actually in, he was in law out. A
peaceable adverse entry, ·coupled with the right
to hold the possession which w-as thereby a·cquired, opertated as an ouster which broke the
continuity of his holding and deprived him of
the title he might have got if he had kept in for
the requisite length of time. He had made no
such location 1as prevented the lands from being
in law vacant. Others had the right to enter
for the purpose of taking.them up, if it could be
done p·eaceably and without force. * * *
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''This brings us to the :fl8Jcts of the present
case. No one ·contends that the defendants
effected their entry and secured their relocation
by force. They knew what Belk had done and
what he was doing. He had no right to the
~possession, and was only on the land at interVIals. There was no enclosure, 'and he had made
no improvements. He apparently exercised no
other acts ·of ownership, ~after January 1, than
every explorer of the mineral lands of the United
States does when he goes on them and uses his
pick to search for and e~amine lodes and veins.
As his !attempted relocation was invalid, his
rights were no more than those of a simple
explorer. In two months he had done, as he
himself says, 'no hard work on the claim,' and
he 'probably put two days' work on the ground.'
This was the extent of his possession. He was
not an original discoverer, but he :sought to avail
himself of what others had found. Relying on
what he ~had done in December, he did not do
what was ne·cessary to effect a valid relocation
:after J anUJary 1. His possession might have
been such as would have enabled him to bring
an action of trespass against one who entered
without 'any ·color of right, but it was not enough,
as we think, to p-revent an entry pea-ceably. land
in good faith for the purp·ose of securing a right
under the act of Congress to the exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property. The defendants having got into possession 'and perfected a relocation, have secured the better right.
When this suit mas begun they had not only
possession but a right granted by the United
States to ·Continue their possession against all
adverse ·~claimants. The possession by Belk was

102
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that of 'R mere intruder, while that of the defendants was aecqmpanied by color of title. (104
u.s. 285, 287, 288)
The decision of the Colorado Sup~reme Court in
3ft. Rosa; IJiining, 1~/illing & Land Co. v. Palmer (26
Colo. 56, 56 Pac. 176) is a precedent which requires
careful consideration in this case. Involved was the
location of two lode mining claims by the plaintiff situate within the exterior boundaries of a .certain tract
of land conveyed tQ the defendant by a gove·rnment
patent !as placer mining ground. The jury and court
found that the vein OT lode within the lode claims was
known to exist within the bowndaries of the place~ at
the time the defendant applied for patent to such placer.
The plaintiff's grantors made peacea~le entrance prior
to application for patent by defendant upon the placer
area and made location -of the lode mining :claims.
The court wrote in part as follows :

" * * * It has been uniformly held that a
patent for a placer .claim does not ·convey title
or right of possession to the patentee to any
lodes known to exist therein ·at the d·~te of application; that, if he desires to obtain such title and
possession, he must comply with the provisions
of section 2333, an-d patent them as lode claims.
* • * While we recognize to itf? full extent the
rule that precludes the initiation of ·a right
through a trespass upon the lawful possession
of another, we think, under the establishe-d jjacts
in this case, appellant is not in a position to
invoke its protection. The lodes in question were
known to exist prior to the application for patent, and, appellant not having taken the neces-
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sary ·steps to obtain possession of them, they
were open to location by others at the time they
were loc,ated by the grantor;s of appellee. In
making the locations, no right of appellant was
invaded, and their validity, therefore, i~ in no
way affected by the fact that they were made
within the surface boundaries of a prior placer
location." (56 Pac. 177, 178)
The court therefore determined that the lode locations
were valid.
The next important decision on this point to be
considered is ClippBr Min. Co. v. Eli Mining & Land Co.
(29 Colo. 377, 68 Pac. 286). Here was involved 'a question pertaining to the vralidity of location of four lode
mining claims within a prior placer location. The plaintiff's predecessor in title made location of the .Se~arl
placer and applied for ~patent. The 'application was
opposed upon the ground that the same Wlas not placer
ground but was only valuable for lode claims or town
site purposes. After an investigation, a hearing was
ordere·d ~and 'application f;or patent was dismissed in
that it was not made to appear that the ground was
distinctively valuable for mining purposes or that
required imp.rovements had been made. This ruling
was affirmed by the Commissioner of the Land Office
and the Secretary of the Interior. Twelve days after
the latter's de~cision, the grantors of the defendant
company entered upon the placer location ·and located
lode claims.
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The Colorado Supreme Court then proceeds to distinguish the facts involved in the Clipper case fron1
those involved in the .~.lit. Rosa case. It wrote:

''In the latter ease [Mt. Rosa] the facts were
that lode claims were kno'""D to exist, and were
also duly located within the limits of a previously
located placer claim before patent of the l·atter
was applied for. A patent for the placer having
been issued jn suGh circumstances; it was held
that, inasmuch as the ·ap•plicant did not at the
time mention the lode claims, or cl·aim them by
virtue of lode locations, they were excluded from
the grant of his patent; and,- as it further appeared that the locators_ of these lode ·claims went
upon the placer ground, -and made locations upon
veins known to exist before the ap·plication for
patent was made, the conclusion was that the
patentee of the placer could not recover possession of the lode claims, for they were properly
located. The court said that in making them
no right of the placer owner was invaded, ·and
that their validity was not affected by the fact
that they were made within the surface boundaries of a prior placer location. For" the purposes of the case, it must have been -assumed
as true that when the entry by the locators of
the lode claims was made the lodes t~hemselves
were known to exist. If the facts of the case iat .
bar [Clipper case] were the same as those in
the Mt. Rosa Case, we would, under its doctrine, be obliged to reverse the judgment; but
they are essentially different, in at least one
particular, to which we shall hereafter refer.''
( 68 P·ac. 288)
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The ·court then proceeded :
''In the Mt. Rosa Case, however, wherein was
defined the rights of a pla:cer claimant, we said
that a placer location gives a qualified possession
of the ground located; that is to say, it confers
upon the owner the exclusive right of possession of the surface area for all purposes incident
to the use and operation of the same as a placer
mining claim, and all unknown lodes or veins,
but does not give the right of possession to known
veins within its limits. It is obvious that the
facts of the ·case in hand [Clipper :case] do not
bring it within the principles laid down in the
Mt. Rosa Case. If, in the case at bar, the lode
·claims were known to exist at the time of the
entry of defendant '.s grantors upon the Se-arl
placer, under the decision in the Mt. Rosa Case
the entry was not unlawful; but if, on .the contrary, the veins were then unknown, by the same
decision the right of possession of this ground
belonged to the ·owners of the placer location.
Their right of possession included these unknown
veins, and the entry for prosp~ecting was a tre_spass, and no title could thereby be initiated.
* * * ·Our conclusion, therefore, is that one may
n:ot go upon a p~rior valid placer location to
prosp.ect for wnknown lodes, and get title to lode
claims thereafter discovered and loca.ted in this
manner and within the placer boundaries, 'Wnless
the placer owne.r has abandoned his claim, waives
the trespass, or by his conduct is estopped to
complain of it. If the trial ·court in tended to rule
that in no -circumstances may one, before application for a patent of a pl·acer claim, go upon
the ground within its exterior boundaries for the
p·urpose of locating a lode, it went too far; * * *.
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For, under the authorities, a prospector may not
ente·r upon a prior placer location for the purpose of prospecting for, or locating, unknown
lodes or veins; and, to uphold the judgment, we
must presume that the evidence before the trial
.court showed that the veins or lodes upon which
defendant's grantors based their locations were
unknown when they entered upon the Searl
placer for the purpose of prospecting.'' (68 Pac.
288, 289. Emphasis supplied.)
Upon rehearing, the Colorado Supreme Court s.aid:
''And, in order to uphold the judgment, we
shall assume, as very properly we may, that the
trial court, as a matter of fact, found that the
lodes were not known to exist until ·afte·r the
application for a patent was made. • * * We
then had in mind, as we do now, _the distinction
between the facts of that case [Mt. Rosa] and
the case at bar. There it was unquestione·d that
the lode claims were known to exist within the
limits of the placer location before an application
for patent for the latter was made. In the case
at bar, ;as we have seen, the findings -of fact of
the trial court, which upon this review are conclusive upon us, are that the lode claims were
not known to exist until long after the application for the placer patent was filed. The distinction is vital, and the rule in the two cases
is different.'' (68 Pac. 290, 291)
The Clipper Min. Co. sued out a writ of error
to the Supreme Court of the United States, and in 194
U. S. 220, 48 ·Law Ed. 944, 24 Sup. Ct. 632, is found
the decision of that high ·court.- Mr. Justice Brewer,
in his opinion, first states the settled rule that in an
action at law the Supreme Court has no juris·diction to
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review the ·conclusions of the highest court of the state
upon a question of facts .. He then proceeds:
''It must, theref·ore, be aecepted that the
Searl placer claim was duly located,_ that the an.
nual labor required by law had been performed
up to the time of the litigation, that there was a
subsisting valid placer location, and that the
lodes were Qiscovered by their locators within
the boundaries of the placer claim subsequently
to its location." (194 U.S. 222)
T~he opinion then repeats -a quotation ma;de by the
Colorado Sup~reme Court wherein it referred to the
Mt. Rosa case. This quotation from the Mt. Rosa case
is set forth above. Further, Justice Brewer writes:
''A placer location is not a location of lodes
.or veins un:derneath the ·Surface, but is -simply .a
claim of a tract or p~arcel of ground for the sake
-of loose deposits of mineral upon or near the
surface. A lode or vein may he known to exist
at the time of the placer location or not known
until long after a patent therefor has been issued.
Tjhere being no necess-ary connection between the
placer and the vein C,ongre:ss by the section has
~provided that in an application for a p~lacer patent
the applicant shall include any vein or lode of
which he has possession, and that if he does not
make such inclusion the omission is to be taken as
a ~conclusive declaration that he has no right of
possession of such vein or lode. If, however,
no vein ·or lode within the placer claim is known
to ~xist at the time the p~atent is issued, then the
patentee takes title to any which may be subsequently discovered.
"While by the ~statute the right of exclusive
possession and enjoyment is given to ·a locator,
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whether his location be of a lode claim or a
placer claim, yet the effect of a patent is different. The patent of .a lode claim confirms the
original location, with the right of exclusive
possession and conveys title to the tract covered
by the location together with all veins, lodes
and ledges which have their a1)iexes therein,
whereas the patent to the placer claim, while
confirming the original location and conveying
title to the placer ground, does not necessarily
convey the title to all veins, lodes and ledges
within its area. It makes no differen·ce whether
a vein or lode within the boundaries of a lode
claim is known or unknown, for the locator is
entitled to the exclusive possession and enjoyment of all the veins and lodes and the patent
confirms his title to them. But a patent of a
placer claim will not convey the title to a known
vein or lode Vtithin its area unless that vein is
specifically applied and- paid for.

• • • • •
"We agree with the Supreme Court -of _Coljorado ·as to the law when it S'ays that 'one may not
go upon a p-rior valid placer location to p·rospect
for unknown lodes and -get title to lode claims
thereafter discovered and located in this manner
and within the ~placer boundaries, unless the
placer owner has ·abandoned his claim, waives
the trespass, or by his conduct is estopped to
complain of it.' " (p. 228-229, 230)
The above review of_ the Clipper -case, through its
appell'ate procedure reveals definitely the vital point
which must be kept in mind in this case and which
will be hereinafter discussed.

109
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A.s usual, Mr. Lindley summarizes the whole matter
in the following quotation from his Treatise:
''We are justified in deducing from the foregoing the following conclusions :'' (1) A perfected placer location does not
confer the right to the possession of veins or
lodes, which may be found to exist within' the
p·lacer limits ~at any time prior to filing. 'an application for a placer patent;
'' {2) Such lodes may be ·appropriated (a)
.by the placer claimant or (b) by others, provided the appropriation is effected by pe'aceable
methods and in good faith;
'' (3) Where a lode is known to exist within
the limits of a placer location at any time prior
to t·he placer application for patent, -and is not
claimed in the ·application as a lode, the title to
such lode does not pass by the patent, but it
may be located by anyone having the requisite
qualifications, provided the location is made
peaceably and in good faith.'' (II Lindley on
Mines, § 413, pp. 966-967)
The facts of the instant case bring it within the
rule of the Mt. Rosa case above cited and not of the
Clipper c'ase, snp•ra. The evidence is clear and undisputed that the existence of the Armstrong ''iron mine"
was well known at the time app,lication for patent to
the Armstrong placer was made; otherwise the application would not have· include~d a ·des-cription of part
of the iron mine and the patent to Walker and Blair
would have made no reference to it. The mineral deposit
manifestly was a well-known, notorious geological fact
1.10
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prior to the application for the Armstrong placer patent
and prior to the issuance of the p'atent. The patent
itself ·proves that the deposit existed and knowledge of
its existence 1nust be ilnputed conclusively to the
patentees. They elected to secure title to a. part of this
deposit but failed to secure title to that part of it within
the "conflict area". Neither the patentees nor their
successors in title are in a position to contend that
that part of the mineral deposit within the ''·conflict
area'' was unknown to the patentees. Judge Marshall
in his opinion in Equity Action 522 antici1}a ted this situation, for he wrote:
* * In accordance with the ·directions from
the G. L. 0. and on November 15, 1879, Ferdinand
Dickert, a U. S. Deputy Mineral Surveyor, was
directed to make an official survey of the lode
within the placer so as to show its true boundaries. He went. upon the ·grounds ·and marked
the boundaries of the lode claim, making it approximately 390 ft. in length and 225 ft. in
width with the discovery point of the lode in the.
·center of the south end line; thereafter on December 16, 1879, a patent was duly issued to the
grantees :of the ap'P'licant for the Armstrong
Placer and for this lode specifically describing
it by the ·description returned. by Mr. Dickert.
* * *It is incredible that if the discovery point of
the Armstrong lode placed by him [Dickert] on
this line was known to be on the vein that it could
have been supposed that the vein suddenly
ceased at that point. * * * The position of th·e
plaintiff seems to be that if a placer limits prior
to the application for a patent it becomes a known
vein only to the extent of the actual dis·covery;
'' *
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only for the few feet he may see it does it fall
within the ·category -of known veins. He then
with respect to this vein would occu'py a vas~ly
more advantageous ·position than the ordinary
dis·coverer of a vein. He would not be required
to make any exploration to determine the direction of the lode which had been discovered at
one point. Indeed, under this construction of the
law it would advantage him not to develop the
ground. The greater the· extent of the lode he
developed the more ground he would be required
t'o pay a double price for. This, I think, was not
the intent of Congress. When an owner of a
placer prior to application for patent once knows
of the existence of a vein within the exterior
limits of his claim although he has only dis~
covered it at one point, the vein, whatever its
extent is in the category of known veins. He
can only obtain title to it by virtue of a lode
location. His placer location before patent gives
him no right to any known vein. If unknown
however a patent to the placer ·confers title. * • •
The surface lines adop~ted by him limit his right
to the vein to the same extent as if he had only
a lode location. He has the oppo-rtunity to de·
velop the ·course of his lode and must suffer the
consequences of a failure to do so. To the extent
the vein is not covered his application for a
patent is conclusive decla~ation that he has no
rig·ht to it.''
From the :foregoing, the conclusion is irrefutable
that when Justheim made the location of the Lucky
claims on that part of the mineral deposit in the ''con·
fiict area'' he was not a tresp·asser and his entry and
presence was not tortious. He had a right to be there.
He did not go onto the Armstrong placer to explore or
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discover the existence of the Armstrong ''iron ntine ''.
He went for the purpose of locating lode claims upon
a deposit "~hich "~as known to exist prior to the issuance
of th_~ ,,~ alker-Blair patent and application therefor.
Through all of the years it had remained open
public domain subject to location Wlder the mining laws of the United States and the State of
Utah. Were the la-'v other than that elucidated
by the Jlt. Rosa and Clipper cases, the whole purpose of R.S. 2333 (U.S.C ...:\.., Tit. 30, § 37) would be
defeated. Although the patentee of a placer obtained
no title to a lode which was known to him to exist p·rior
to the application for the placer patent, but which was
not included in the patent, he could prevent the location
of the lode by others on the ground that thir·d party
locators were trespassers. This certainly is not the
law. The Armstrong patent, when it failed to include
the part of the "iron mine" within the "conflict area",
in effect declared it was open for location by third
parties. When Justheim made his locations, he availed
himself of an invitation long extended to the public
by the ·plaintiff, Excelsior Iron Mining Co., and its
predecessors in title.
With the foregoing discussion, Gorlinski 's long-·~o
relationship with plaintiff's predecessor in title and
its trustee becomes an irrelevant and immaterial matter.
Insofar as the validity of Justheim's locations is· concerned, Justheim could have secured his information
from the public records or from any ·other source of
information. Gorlinski at the time of his en;tployment
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by Justheim to make the Lucky locations was under no
obligations of any kind to the plaintiffs or to their
pTedecessors in title. No fiduciary relationship existed
between them. Further, the p·eriodic litigation involving the ''conflict area'' had a:rs.closed to the public the
condition existing in the "conflict area" and its potentialities. The conclusion must be on this aspect of the
case that the area of the mineral ~deposit covered by
the Lucky claims was open J)Ublic domain which Justheim had the right to enter upon for the purpose of
locating his claims.
It is proper at this time to invite the Supreme
Court's attention to its decision in Spring-er v. Southern
Pac. Go. (67 Utah 590, 248 Pac. 819). While this invitation is undoubtedly in anticipation of appellees' argument, frankness .demands that this decision be discussed. In the instant action appellees particularly
pleaded in their rep,ly to the counterclaim and cross
complaint of appellant Justheim that the claim of said
cross complaint was barred by the provisions of Section 7, Chap. 2, Title 104, Utah Code 1943 and Section 38, Chapter 2, Title 30, United States Code Annotate·d (the Federal statute thus designated is identical
with R.S. 2332). The trial court in this action found
adversely to the appellees' plea of adverse possession
and statute of limitations in their reply. Finding 16
specifically recites:

'' '* * * Neither of the plaintiffs nor the

p~ain

tiffs' predecessors, have been working. the ore
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body in controversy continuously for a period of

seven years next prior to April 3, 1949." (R. 79)
This finding stands unimpaired and as a consequenc.e
the questions of adverse possession and statute of limitations have been eliminated from the instant case and
it is on this point that the instant case is ~different from
the Springer case n1entioned. In that decision the question discllSSed ,,~as 'vhether R.S. 2332 (U.S.C.A. Tit.
30, § 38) ·could be successfully pleaded and sustained
by the defendant in that action 'vhen the evidence showed
that it had been in possession for over twenty continuous ye·ars of a part of the public ·domain- under
void lode claim locations. The evidence showed t·he continuous open adverse_ p·ossession of a disputed area
by the defendant, the expenditure by it of _large sums
of money thereon, and the payment of ad valorem taxes.
The court concluded that as ·against adverse placer locators the plea of R.S. 2332 could be sustained. While
there is language used in the case as to the conduct of
the placer locators (being the plaintiffs' p~redecessors in
title), the opinion deals basically with the question of the
applicability of R.S. 2332. The ·holding in the Springe1·
case is of no value in the instant case, first because the
appellees failed in their proof of adverse possession
and the statute of limitations and secondly the actions
of the defendants in making the Lucky locations were
neither fraudulent, surreptitious nor deceitful. As has
been demonstrated, the part of the mineral deposit
within the "conflict area" located by J ustheim was
public domain and the plaintiffs and appellees, since
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they failed in their plea of adverse possession and -statute of limitations, were trespassessers thereon.

CONCLUSION
From the foregoing ~dis~cus~sion, the following conclusions are presented by the appellants:
1. That the ''conflict area'' insofar as the Annstrong ''iron mine'' is concerned actually exists as a
matter of official re·cords.
2. That the patent to Jones of Tract A vested
him with no title to that part of the deposit in the "conflict area'' upon which the Lucky locations are made.
3. That since Jones had no title to that part of
the ''conflict area" upon which the Lucky locations
were made, his quitclaim deed to the predecessor in
title of the plaintiff Excelsior Iron Mining Company
conveyed nothing to it and hence said plaintiff has
no ti tie to same.
4. That the conveyance by the United States Gov.
ernment to Walker and Blair of the part of the Armstrong ''iron mine'' de'Scribed in the Armstrong patent
conveyed no interest in that ·part of the mineral deposit
within the ' 'conflict area''.
5. That that p~art of the mineral ~deposit within
the ''conflict area'' except Tract A was public domain
and open to location by others.
6. That Justheim was not a trespasser in making
his locations of the Lucky claims but made them upon
public domain as of right.
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7. That the Lucky claims are valid subsisting locations owned by the defendant J ustheim.

WHEREFORE, .A.PPELLANTS RESPECTFULLY SUBMIT THAT THE JUDGMENT IN THIS
ACTION SHOlTLD BE SET ASIDE AND THAT THE
SUPRE~fE COURT SHOULD DIRECT THE DISTRICT COURT TO l\IAKE, ENTER AND FILE ITS
JUDGMENT QUIETING THE TITLE IN AND TO
THE LUCKY CLAIMS IN THE APPELLANT,
·JUSTHEIM, .A.G.AlNST ALL CLAIMS, INTERESTS,
TITLES OR DE~IANDS OF THE PLAINTIFFS AND
EACH OF THEM.
Respectfully submitted,

FRANKLIN RITER

Atto.rney for DefendOJn,ts and Appell01nts
312 Kearns Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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